

Description

This invention relates to a method of providing a remote accessing system applicable, for example, to automotive vehicle entry.

It is well known to use digitally encoded signals over a radio link to open garage doors or unlock vehicle doors, for example, from a remote transmitter. Commonly, systems employing such control methods have a remote unit which may be carried in ones pocket or on a key chain and have a button which is pressed to issue a command signal. It is very desirable to make such systems secure from unauthorized use. This is especially important when the remote transmitter is used not only to unlock a vehicle door but also to actuate the vehicle ignition. When the signals are transmitted by radio frequency waves, it is possible to intercept these signals and then to record them for later retransmission to operate the vehicle. More elaborate signalling procedures are needed to preclude such possibilities.

Encryption has been used for secure communications in areas of national security or for computer security, for example. To achieve the highest security, a number of methods have recently been adopted. A number of recent developments are described in the paper by Diffie, "The First Ten Years of Public-Key Cryptography", Proc. IEEE, Vol.76, No. 5, May 1988, pp560-577, the disclosure of which is incorporated herein by reference. The RSA public key system described therein is a widely accepted security measure which might be used for vehicle security, although it involves very large key numbers and an amount of computation which is beyond the operating time and power constraints of an automotive system with a small remote unit. A precursor of the public key system, also described by Diffie, is the exponential key exchange. This is used along with other cryptographic techniques in the system described below. The RSA system public key system may also be used when a smaller key number is acceptable for the required level of security.

DE-A-3820248 describes a method in accordance with the preamble of claim 1.

The present invention seeks to provide an improved method of providing a remote accessing system.

In accordance with the present invention, a method of providing a remote accessing system is characterised over DE-A-3820248 by the features specified in the characterising portion of claim 1.

It is possible with the present invention to provide a system in which one or more of the following may apply:

1. It has an arbitrarily high level of security even if all communications can be monitored and all

aspects of the design are known.

2. The remote unit cannot be copied or imitated even with physical access to the unit.

3. One remote unit may be used with an unlimited number of base units.

4. Compromise of one base unit shall not compromise other uses of the same remote unit.

5. No operator input is needed beyond sign-up initiation.

6. All functions other than radio transmission can be implemented by a single IC for each unit which can operate at very low power and complete the normal functions in a fraction of a second.

In a practical embodiment, there is provided a method of encrypted communication comprising the steps of: registering the remote unit with the base unit by establishing a common key by communication between the base unit and the remote unit, and storing the common key and an encrypted form of the common key in the base unit; then authenticating the remote unit by encrypting a random number with the common key in the base unit, passing the encrypted common key and a challenge number from the base unit to the remote unit wherein the challenge number comprises the random number or the encrypted random number, decrypting the common key in the remote unit, operating on the challenge number with the common key in the remote unit, and comparing the results.

An embodiment of the present invention is described below, by way of illustration only, with reference to the accompanying drawings, in which:

Figure 1 is a schematic diagram of a remote access system for an automotive vehicle;

Figure 2 is a diagram of base unit and remote unit modes for the system of Figure 1;

Figure 3 is a diagram of an embodiment of initialization operations; and

Figures 4 and 5 are diagrams of an embodiment of authentication operations.

The ensuing description is directed to a security method and system designed for use in unlocking vehicle doors and/or ignition switches by an electronic key coupled to the vehicle by a radio link. The same electronic key or remote unit can be used with an unlimited number of base units to gain access to home, office or other vehicles, for example. It will be apparent, however, that the method is applicable as well to other uses such as signal transmission within a vehicle, computer system security, vehicle identification for toll payments or car rental returns, for example, among other uses.

Figure 1 shows a vehicle 10 equipped with a remote access system including a base unit 12 in the vehicle and a remote unit 14 typically carried in

the vehicle driver's pocket or purse. The units are coupled by radio communication effective over a short distance. As indicated by dotted lines 16 adjacent each vehicle door handle 18 and lines 20 adjacent the vehicle boot, minimum distances of only a few feet are required although a larger radius of communication may be provided. It is intended that when the driver carries the remote unit within radio range of the base unit the system will automatically act to unlock the door without activation by the operator, provided that the identification of the remote unit can be verified. In some applications the units are activated only when the driver touches or tries to operate the door handle 18.

A randomly chosen secret key code S, at least 56 bits long, and a unique identification code ID are permanently programmed in the remote unit 14 (using an EPROM) at the time of manufacture. By choosing the secret key code S from a very large number of possibilities, it is effectively unique but it is only necessary that there be no way to decipher it. In particular, the manufacturing equipment that programs the remote units with their unique identification code ID and secret key code S must destroy all memory of the secret key code S after it has verified proper programming. To keep the key code S secret, another bit is programmed into the key code S which prevents it from being read or changed.

The base unit 12 and the remote unit 14 operate in various modes as indicated in Figure 2. The units must first be initialized to select randomly a common key code and to register the identification code ID of the remote unit 14 with the base unit 12. This mode is authorized by operator input such as by entry of an access code on a keyboard in the vehicle. No other mode requires operator input. The initialization occurs only once to introduce a remote unit 14 to a base unit 12, however, when a remote unit 14 is used with more than one base unit 12 or when a base unit 12 is used with more than one remote unit 14, an initialization must take place for each pair of units.

After being initialized, the remote unit 14 assumes a sleep state for low power consumption. When the remote unit 14 enters the radio range of the base unit 12, a wake-up mode is entered wherein a signal from the base unit 12 wakes up or alerts the remote unit 14 to prepare its circuits for interrogation. This starts the identification mode. Then the base unit 12 sends out identification signals corresponding to the various remote unit's identification codes stored in the base unit 12. If an identification signal matches the identification code ID of the particular remote unit 14 in its range, the remote unit 14 responds that a match has been made. The authentication mode is then entered to

verify that the remote unit 14 is indeed an authorized unit. During this mode, an exchange of encrypted signals based on the previously established secret key code S takes place.

After the wakeup, the general approach is for the base unit 12 first to identify which, if any, of several authorized remote units 14 is in its vicinity by a conventional polling scheme. The base unit 12 then requests the remote unit 14 for information that only the legitimate remote unit 14 can have. The request and correct response must be different each time to prevent accepting the playback of a previous correct response. The correct response must not be related to the request in a simple way. For a secure system, it should not be possible to deduce the correct response with full knowledge of the system and all previous communications.

Cryptographic techniques provide means to accomplish this. A cryptosystem performs a complicated transformation from input to output under the control of a variable called the key(s). Knowing the correct key, it is possible to do the inverse transformation and recover the original input. For an ideal cryptographic system (cryptosystem) there should be no better way to determine the input from the output than trying all possible keys. By making this number large enough, it becomes unfeasible to break the key even using a very high speed computer. An example of such a system is the data encryption standard (DES) approved by National Bureau of Standards and National Security Agency as suitable for computer data security, electronic funds transfer, etc. short of national security. DES uses a 56-bit key giving about 72 quadrillion possibilities.

Conventional cryptosystems, such as DES, use the same key for both encryption and decryption. Each pair needing to communicate securely must have an individual key known to both but not anyone else. Security is a matter of keeping this private key secure. Public key cryptosystems use different keys for encryption and decryption where one cannot be easily derived from the other. The degree of difficulty can be made arbitrarily high by making the keys sufficiently long.

The stated objectives can be met while staying within the constraints of low power consumption and quick response with a combination of a private key cryptosystem and either the RSA public key system or the exponential key exchange previously mentioned and which is set forth in U.S. Patent No. 4,200,770. Exponential key exchange allows a remote unit and base unit to agree mutually upon a private key over an unsecured channel as follows. The remote unit and base unit each secretly select a number, F and B, respectively. They then compute $M^F \text{ mod } N$ and $M^B \text{ mod } N$, respectively, where N is a large prime number and both M and N are

known to everyone. They exchange answers and then compute $P = (M^B \cdot \text{mod } N)^F \cdot \text{mod } N$ and $P = -(M^F \cdot \text{mod } N)^B \cdot \text{mod } N$, respectively. They each arrive at the same value, $P = M^{F \cdot B} \cdot \text{mod } N$, from a different combination of secret and public information. An eavesdropper cannot derive this value because of the difficulty of deriving F or B from $M^F \cdot \text{mod } N$ or $M^B \cdot \text{mod } N$ for large N. P is then shortened to the proper length and used as the private key for this particular remote unit and base unit pair.

To assure difficulty of deriving F or B, it is preferred that they have a length of several hundred bits, although a practical system may have only about 256 bits. While the base unit 12 may have a random number generator, this is not desirable for the remote unit 14. To provide such a large number having a random nature, a small random or pseudo-random seed number is provided by the base unit 12 and passed to the remote unit 14. This seed is operated upon in conjunction with the secret key S to generate a number having 256 bits which is used as the exponent F.

To allow a single remote unit 14 to operate with an unlimited number of base units 12 (using an unlimited number of different values P) the remote unit 14 does not store its copy of P. It lets the base unit do the storage. The remote unit 14 first encrypts its copy of P using the built in secret key, S, to give $Q = S(P)$ then passes Q over the radio link to the base unit 12. The base unit 12 stores Q along with its copy of P and the remote unit ID in its table of authorized users. This concludes the initialization or sign-up procedure.

The initialization is shown in Figure 3 which illustrates the operations in each of the base and remote units and the communications therebetween. First the base unit 12 transmits the seed A to the remote unit 14 which derives the exponent F from the key code S and A while the base unit 12 selects an exponent B. Then, each unit calculates the particular remainder for its respective calculated exponential and transmits only the remainder to the other unit. Each unit calculates P by combining the local remainder and the received remainder. The base unit 12 stores P while the remote unit 14 encrypts P using secret key S and passes it to the base unit 12 for storage. The ID is passed to the base for storage as well.

Other methods of selecting a common key may be used. The prime requisite is that the units agree on a randomly selected key in a secure manner. Public key cryptography may be used for this purpose. Public key cryptosystems use different keys for encryption and decryption where one cannot be easily derived from the other. The above mentioned RSA public key system is suitable. The public key system is used to commu-

nicate a common key for the base and remote units and the key is encrypted by the remote unit and stored in the base unit as described above.

After the remote unit is registered with the base unit as an authorized user, the remote unit can forget everything except the secret key, S, and its identification code ID. When the base unit wishes to challenge the remote unit to prove its identity, it passes to the remote unit the encrypted private key, Q, and a random number, R. This pair of numbers comprises the challenge. The remote unit uses its secret key to decrypt Q to give $P = S'(Q)$. It then uses P to encrypt R to give $X = P(R)$ which it returns to the base unit 12. Meanwhile the base unit 12 uses its copy of P to encrypt R to give $X = P(R)$. The base unit 12 compares the X's and, if they match, the remote unit 14 is accepted as authentic.

The authentication method (as well as the ID interrogation) is shown in Figure 4 which illustrates the operations in each of the base and remote units. The base unit 12 has stored therein the key P, the identification code ID and the encrypted key Q while the remote unit 14 has stored therein the identification code ID and key S. The base unit 12 transmits the ID and the remote unit compares it with its ID, and if there is a match, a reply is transmitted to the base unit 12. When no reply is received, the next ID stored in the base unit 12 is transmitted. When a reply is received, a random number R is generated and sent to the remote unit 14 along with the Q which corresponds to the ID which was matched in the remote unit 14. The remote unit 14 decrypts Q to get P and encrypts R to get X and passes it to the base. In the meantime the base unit 12 also encrypts R to get X and compares the two X's.

Figure 5 shows a variant on the above described authentication operation. Here, R is encrypted to get X and the challenge comprises X and Q which are both decrypted in the remote unit 14 to obtain R which is passed to the base unit 12 and compared with the original R to determine whether there is a match.

To provide tolerance to faulty communications, two different strategies are used. Some communications, such as the challenge and key exchange, must be perfect because the encryption process has the effect of randomizing the entire output if any input bit is changed. When communications are usually good but sometimes very bad and retransmission is possible, error checking can be more effective than error correction coding. A cyclic redundancy check with retransmission on request is preferred for critical messages.

For other communications close is good enough. The correct response to the challenge is already known to the base unit. The probability of a

random response having 90% of a total of 64 bits correct is about 1 in 200 billion. During polling the remote unit is looking for its specific ID. By selecting the ID's properly at the time of manufacture, all ID can be guaranteed to differ by some number of bits. For example 67 million 32 bit ID's can be made to differ by at least four bits. The remote unit can answer to an ID that comes within 1 or 2 or even 3 bits of its own with very high confidence. This is a passive form of error correction. Similarly, the final comparison step of the authentication procedure does not have to require an exact match of all bits so long as there is a high probability that the remote unit determined the correct value in response to the challenge.

Both security and economic needs can be met by putting all the functions except the radio transceiver on a single IC. Secret information cannot be extracted from the IC without destroying it and then it is extremely difficult. The base unit 12 performs many of the same functions as the remote unit 14. The IC can be designed to do either by providing a mode selection and host computer port. The base unit 12 contains a host computer to interface to the vehicle and to maintain the authorization list. The host port can also facilitate production testing.

It is not necessary to include a random number generator in the IC. For the base unit 12, a host computer can perform this function in software. The remote unit 14 does not need its own random numbers. During sign-up, the remote unit 14 needs a seed number which is different each time. As described above, a different number is provided by the base unit 12 and the remote unit 14 makes it secret by encrypting it with the secret key S. The number is both unpredictable and secret without an explicit random number generator.

Only the correct remote unit 14, the one with which keys were initially exchanged, can provide the correct answer because only it has the correct key code S to transform Q to P. In effect, the key code S is only used by the remote unit 14 itself at a later time. There is never any need or ability for the key code S to be shared.

Claims

1. A method of providing a remote accessing system, which system comprises a base unit (12) and a remote unit (14) adapted to communicate with one another via a communication link, said method being characterised by the steps of
providing an individual key (S) in the remote unit;
registering the remote unit with the base unit, which registering step includes

- (i) establishing a common key (P) in the base and remote units,
- (ii) deriving in the remote unit an encrypted common key (Q) on the basis of the individual key (S),
- (iii) transferring the encrypted common key (Q) to the base unit, and
- (iv) storing the common key (P) and the encrypted common key (Q) in the base unit; and authenticating the remote unit, which authenticating step includes

- (i) obtaining in the base unit a random number (R) and an encrypted random number (X) derived from the random number (R) and the common key (P),

- (ii) transferring to the remote unit the encrypted common key (Q) and either the random number (R) or the encrypted random number (X),

- (iii) decrypting in the remote unit the encrypted common key (Q) on the basis of the individual key (S) to obtain the common key (P) and either encrypting the received random number (R) or decrypting the received encrypted random number (X) on the basis of the obtained common key (P) to form a value,

- (iv) transferring the value to the base unit, and

- (v) comparing the value with its associated random number (R) or encrypted random number (X) obtained in the base unit.

2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the common key (P) is established by exponential key exchange.
3. A method according to claim 1, wherein the common key (P) is established by a cryptographic method.
4. A method according to claim 1, 2 or 3, wherein the step of establishing a common key (P) includes the steps of passing a random seed (A) to the remote unit (14) and generating with the individual key (S) and the seed (A) a number (F) for use in establishing the common key (P).
5. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein the step of comparing the value with its associated random number (R) or encrypted random number (X) determines that a match exists when the value is substantially equal to its associated random number (R) or the encrypted random number (X).



random response having 90% of a total of 64 bits correct is about 1 in 200 billion. During polling the remote unit is looking for its specific ID. By selecting the ID's properly at the time of manufacture, all ID can be guaranteed to differ by some number of bits. For example 67 million 32 bit ID's can be made to differ by at least four bits. The remote unit can answer to an ID that comes within 1 or 2 or even 3 bits of its own with very high confidence. This is a passive form of error correction. Similarly, the final comparison step of the authentication procedure does not have to require an exact match of all bits so long as there is a high probability that the remote unit determined the correct value in response to the challenge.

Both security and economic needs can be met by putting all the functions except the radio transceiver on a single IC. Secret information cannot be extracted from the IC without destroying it and then it is extremely difficult. The base unit 12 performs many of the same functions as the remote unit 14. The IC can be designed to do either by providing a mode selection and host computer port. The base unit 12 contains a host computer to interface to the vehicle and to maintain the authorization list. The host port can also facilitate production testing.

It is not necessary to include a random number generator in the IC. For the base unit 12, a host computer can perform this function in software. The remote unit 14 does not need its own random numbers. During sign-up, the remote unit 14 needs a seed number which is different each time. As described above, a different number is provided by the base unit 12 and the remote unit 14 makes it secret by encrypting it with the secret key S. The number is both unpredictable and secret without an explicit random number generator.

Only the correct remote unit 14, the one with which keys were initially exchanged, can provide the correct answer because only it has the correct key code S to transform Q to P. In effect, the key code S is only used by the remote unit 14 itself at a later time. There is never any need or ability for the key code S to be shared.

Claims

1. A method of providing a remote accessing system, which system comprises a base unit (12) and a remote unit (14) adapted to communicate with one another via a communication link, said method being characterised by the steps of providing an individual key (S) in the remote unit; registering the remote unit with the base unit, which registering step includes

- (i) establishing a common key (P) in the base and remote units,
- (ii) deriving in the remote unit an encrypted common key (Q) on the basis of the individual key (S),
- (iii) transferring the encrypted common key (Q) to the base unit, and
- (iv) storing the common key (P) and the encrypted common key (Q) in the base unit; and authenticating the remote unit, which authenticating step includes

- (i) obtaining in the base unit a random number (R) and an encrypted random number (X) derived from the random number (R) and the common key (P),
- (ii) transferring to the remote unit the encrypted common key (Q) and either the random number (R) or the encrypted random number (X),
- (iii) decrypting in the remote unit the encrypted common key (Q) on the basis of the individual key (S) to obtain the common key (P) and either encrypting the received random number (R) or decrypting the received encrypted random number (X) on the basis of the obtained common key (P) to form a value,
- (iv) transferring the value to the base unit, and
- (v) comparing the value with its associated random number (R) or encrypted random number (X) obtained in the base unit.

2. A method according to claim 1, wherein the common key (P) is established by exponential key exchange.
3. A method according to claim 1, wherein the common key (P) is established by a cryptographic method.
4. A method according to claim 1, 2 or 3, wherein the step of establishing a common key (P) includes the steps of passing a random seed (A) to the remote unit (14) and generating with the individual key (S) and the seed (A) a number (F) for use in establishing the common key (P).
5. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein the step of comparing the value with its associated random number (R) or encrypted random number (X) determines that a match exists when the value is substantially equal to its associated random number (R) or the encrypted random number (X).



6. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein the step of authenticating the remote unit (14) comprises the steps of transferring an identification code (ID) to the remote unit, comparing in the remote unit the received identification code (ID) with an identification code (ID) stored in the remote unit, and transferring a reply signal to the base unit when the received identification code substantially matches the stored identification code, the base unit obtaining the random number (R) and the encrypted random number (X) on receipt of the reply signal.

7. A method according to any preceding claim, wherein the communication link is a radio frequency link.

Patentansprüche

1. Ein Verfahren zum Schaffen eines Fernzugangssystems, das eine Basiseinheit (12) und eine Ferneinheit (14) umfaßt, die ausgelegt sind, miteinander über eine Kommunikationsverbindung zu kommunizieren, wobei das Verfahren durch die Schritte gekennzeichnet ist, daß ein individueller Schlüssel (S) in der Ferneinheit geschaffen wird, daß die Ferneinheit bei der Basiseinheit registriert wird, wobei der Registrierungsschritt die Schritte umfaßt, daß

(i) ein gemeinsamer Schlüssel (P) in den Basis- und Ferneinheiten geschaffen wird,

(ii) in der Ferneinheit ein verschlüsselter, gemeinsamer Schlüssel (Q) auf der Grundlage des individuellen Schlüssels (S) abgeleitet wird,

(iii) der verschlüsselte, gemeinsame Schlüssel (Q) zur Basiseinheit übertragen wird, und

(iv) der gemeinsame Schlüssel (P) und der verschlüsselte, gemeinsame Schlüssel (Q) in der Basiseinheit gespeichert werden,

und daß die Ferneinheit authentifiziert wird, wobei der Authentifizierungsschritt die Schritte umfaßt, daß

(i) in der Basiseinheit eine Zufallszahl (R) und eine verschlüsselte Zufallszahl (X), die aus der Zufallszahl (R) und dem gemeinsamen Schlüssel (P) abgeleitet wird, erhalten werden,

(ii) zur Ferneinheit der verschlüsselte, gemeinsame Schlüssel (Q) und entweder die Zufallszahl (R) oder die verschlüsselte Zufallszahl (X) übertragen werden,

(iii) in der Ferneinheit der verschlüsselte gemeinsame Schlüssel (Q) auf der Grundlage des individuellen Schlüssels (S) ent-

schlüsselt wird, um den gemeinsamen Schlüssel (P) zu erhalten, und entweder die empfangene Zufallszahl (R) verschlüsselt oder die empfangene verschlüsselte Zufallszahl (X) entschlüsselt wird auf der Grundlage des erhaltenen gemeinsamen Schlüssels (P), um einen Wert zu bilden,

(iv) der Wert zur Basiseinheit übertragen wird, und

(v) der Wert mit seiner zugehörigen Zufallszahl (R) oder verschlüsselten Zufallszahl (X) verglichen wird, die in der Basiseinheit erhalten werden.

2. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, worin der gemeinsame Schlüssel (P) durch exponentiellen Schlüsselaustausch geschaffen wird.

3. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, worin der gemeinsame Schlüssel (P) durch ein Kryptographie-Verfahren geschaffen wird.

4. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, 2 oder 3, worin der Schritt des Schaffens eines gemeinsamen Schlüssels (P) die Schritte umfaßt, daß der Ferneinheit (14) ein Zufallsausgangsparameter (A) zugeführt und mit dem individuellen Schlüssel (S) und dem Ausgangsparameter (A) eine Zahl (F) zur Verwendung beim Schaffen des gemeinsamen Schlüssels (P) erzeugt wird.

5. Ein Verfahren nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche,

worin der Schritt des Vergleichens des Wertes mit seiner zugehörigen Zufallszahl (R) oder verschlüsselten Zufallszahl (X) feststellt, daß eine Übereinstimmung existiert, wenn der Wert im wesentlichen gleich seiner zugehörigen Zufallszahl (R) oder der verschlüsselten Zufallszahl (X) ist.

6. Ein Verfahren nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, worin der Schritt des Authentifizierens der Ferneinheit (14) die Schritte umfaßt, daß ein Identifizierungscode (ID) zur Ferneinheit übertragen wird, daß in der Ferneinheit der empfangene Identifizierungscode (ID) mit einem in der Ferneinheit gespeicherten Identifizierungscode (ID) verglichen wird, und daß ein Antwortsignal zur Basiseinheit übertragen wird, wenn der empfangene Identifizierungscode im wesentlichen mit dem gespeicherten Identifizierungscode übereinstimmt, wobei die Basiseinheit die Zufallszahl (R) und die verschlüsselte Zufallszahl (X) auf Empfang des Antwortsignals erhält.



7. Ein Verfahren nach einem der vorhergehenden Ansprüche, worin die Kommunikationsverbindung eine Radiofrequenzverbindung ist.

Revendications

1. Procédé pour procurer un système d'accès à distance, lequel système comprend une unité de base (12) et une unité distante (14) adaptées pour communiquer entre elles par un lien de communication, ledit procédé étant caractérisé par les étapes consistant à

procurer une clé individuelle (S) dans l'unité distante;
faire reconnaître l'unité distante auprès de l'unité de base, laquelle étape de reconnaissance inclut:

- (i) l'établissement d'une clé commune (P) dans les unités de base et distante,
- (ii) la dérivation dans l'unité distante d'une clé commune chiffrée (Q) sur la base de la clé individuelle (S),
- (iii) le transfert la clé commune chiffrée (Q) dans l'unité de base, et
- (iv) le stockage de la clé commune (P) et de la clé commune chiffrée (Q) dans l'unité de base;

et authentifier l'unité distante, laquelle étape d'authentification inclut

- (i) l'obtention dans l'unité de base d'un nombre aléatoire (R) et d'un nombre aléatoire chiffré (X) dérivé du nombre aléatoire (R) et de la clé commune (P),
- (ii) le transfert dans l'unité distante de la clé commune chiffrée (Q) et soit le nombre aléatoire (R) soit le nombre aléatoire chiffré (X),
- (iii) le déchiffrement dans l'unité distante de la clé commune chiffrée (Q) sur la base de la clé individuelle (S) afin d'obtenir la clé commune (P) et soit le chiffrement du nombre aléatoire reçu (R) soit le déchiffrement du nombre aléatoire chiffré reçu (X) sur la base de la clé commune obtenue (P) afin de former une valeur,
- (iv) le transfert de la valeur dans l'unité de base, et
- (v) la comparaison de la valeur avec son nombre aléatoire associé (R) ou avec le nombre aléatoire chiffré (X) obtenu dans l'unité de base.

2. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel la clé commune (P) est établie par un échange de clé exponentielle.

3. Procédé selon la revendication 1, dans lequel la clé commune (P) est établie par un procédé

cryptographique.

4. Procédé selon l'une des revendications 1, 2 ou 3, dans lequel l'étape d'établissement d'une clé commune (P) inclut les étapes de passage d'une semence aléatoire (A) à l'unité distante et l'engendrement à partir de la clé individuelle (S) et de la semence (A) d'un nombre (F) à utiliser pour établir la clé commune (P).

5. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, dans lequel l'étape de comparaison de la valeur avec son nombre aléatoire associé (R) ou avec son nombre aléatoire chiffré (X) détermine qu'un accord existe lorsque la valeur est égale en substance à son nombre aléatoire associé (R) ou à son nombre aléatoire chiffré (X).

6. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, dans lequel l'étape d'authentification de l'unité distante (14) comprend les étapes de transfert d'un code d'identification (ID) dans l'unité distante, de comparaison dans l'unité distante du code d'identification (ID) reçu avec un code d'identification (ID) stocké dans l'unité distante, et de transfert d'un signal de réponse dans l'unité de base lorsque le code d'identification reçu est en substance en accord avec le code d'identification stocké, l'unité de base obtenant le nombre aléatoire (R) et le nombre aléatoire chiffré (X) à réception du signal de réponse.

7. Procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, dans lequel le lien de communication est une liaison de fréquence radio.