Description

The present invention relates to a method of transferring data, an electronic document or the like from a first computer system to a second computer system via a data transmission line, e.g. a public data transmission line.

Several techniques and standards are known for transferring data, electronic documents or the like from a first computer system to a second computer system via different data transmission lines such as high speed communication lines, private or public data transmission lines, etc. If the data transmission line itself is not secured against third parties with or without authorization being able to tap the data transferred via the data transmission line or the electronic document transferred via the data transmission line, it is a conventional technique to provide an encryption of the data or the electronic document in accordance with encryption/decryption techniques well-known per se, which techniques may comprise either symmetrical or asymmetrical encryption algorithms, secret or public keys. In this context reference is only to be made to the well-known DES algorithm (Data Encryption Standard), developed by IBM in cooperation with the National Bureau of Standards (NBS), USA. As an example of a data/document exchange protocol mention is here to be made of the data/document exchange protocol -LECAM- developed by FRANCE TELECOM in connection with the Minitel computers used widely in France, in accordance with which the data/document transfer may take place in encrypted and not encrypted form (further specifications of the protocol are given in S.T.U.C.A.M - Spécification Techniques d'Utilisation du LECAM, ©Décembre 1987, FRANCE TELECOM, Télétel). Such an encrypted data transmission presupposes, however, that the transmitter and the receiver can agree to establishing a mutual set of encryption/decryption keys, as the parties involved, transmitter and receiver, invariably have to reveal details concerning security levels, etc. Such an agreement requires, however, that both transmitter and receiver fully trust the other party. Even if the two parties, who are to make a transfer of data or a transfer of one electronic document from a first computer system to a second computer system, can agree to such an exchange of encryption/decryption keys for use in connection with an encryption/decryption algorithm agreed upon, not even such an encrypted data transmission ensures that the data sent from the first computer system or the electronic document sent from the first computer system is received correctly by the second computer system, as it will be possible to manipulate the data or the electronic document in connection with the execution of the encryption algorithm in the first computer system, just as the receiver after decryption can manipulate the data or the electronic document. Such an encrypted data transmission does not in itself ensure that the transfer taking place is the intended or desired transfer of the data or the electronic document, that the data received by the second computer system or the electronic document received by the second computer system, in the form in which the data or the electronic document exists in the second computer system after transfer, is identical to the data sent from the first computer system or the electronic document sent from the first computer system. Such an encrypted data transmission via a public or private data transmission line does neither in itself ensure that the two computer systems communicating with each other are the correct, intended parties of communication.

In DE-A 3 631 797 a method and an apparatus for the encrypting/decrypting of transmitted/received data are described, the apparatus consisting of a communication unit comprising a permanently installed encryption means, as well as operating means which are isolated from the data transmission line. In order to encrypt/decrypt the transmitted/received data a secret key must be input into the permanently installed encryption means, e.g. by copying the keys from a storage medium such as a chip card. The method and the system of the present invention differs from the known system in that the encryption/decryption means as well as the secret key(s) are located exclusively on detachable electronic cards.

The object of the present invention is to provide a method of the type defined above, according to which method it is possible to establish immediately a secure data or document transfer between two computer systems without having to exchange encryption/decryption keys between the computer systems, reveal details concerning security levels, etc., and according to which method it is ensured that the desired data or document transfer actually takes place, as it is ensured that it will not be possible for either of the parties or for a third party to interfere with the data or document transfer. The object of the present invention is thus more explicitly to provide techniques ensuring that at the transfer of data or an electronic document from one first computer system to a second computer system via a data transmission line, e.g. a public data transmission line, it is guaranteed that the data received by the second computer system or the electronic document received by the second computer system is identical to the data sent from the first computer system or the electronic document sent from the first computer system and vice versa.

This object is obtained in accordance with a first aspect of the invention by means of a method of transferring data from a first computer system to a second computer system via a data transmission line wherein for said transfer a first station is used for outputting data from a first electronic card, said first station being

connected to and communicating with said first computer system and furthermore being connected to said data transmission line via said first computer system and interfacing means,

a second station is used for outputting data from a second electronic card, said second station being connected to and communicating with said second computer system and furthermore being connected to said data transmission line via this second computer system and interfacing means,

said data being transferred in encrypted form via said first station to said first computer system and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system to said data transmission line, and

said data being received by said second computer system in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second computer system, said method being characterized in that

said first and second electronic card being temporarily connected to or being detachable from the first and the second station, respectively,

said first and second electronic card each comprise a central data processing unit, an input/output gate for communication with said corresponding station, an encryption/decryption means as well as an internal storage and together constitute a coherent set of electronic cards comprising coherent secret key(s) previously stored in the internal storage of the cards, said secret key(s) being used as encryption/decryption keys or being used for generating coherent encryption/decryption keys, said encryption/decryption keys being input into the internal storage of said cards, and said secret key(s) and said coherent encryption/decryption keys generated by use of the secret key(s) only being handled within the electronic cards,

said data being transferred to said first electronic card from said first computer system via said first station and said input/output gate of said first electronic card, being input into and being temporarily stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said data being output from said internal storage of said first electronic card and being encrypted in said first electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card, and said data being output from said first electronic card in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first electronic card before said transfer of encrypted data from said first computer system to said second computer system,

said transferred encrypted data being transferred from said second computer system to said second electronic card via said second station and via said input/output gate of said second electronic card and being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said data being output from said internal storage of said second electronic card in encrypted form and being decrypted in said second electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said data being output after decryption in said second electronic card from said second electronic card and output to said second computer system via said input/output gate of said second electronic card and via said second station,

said data being transferred from the first computer system to the second computer system without exchanging any secret keys between the computer systems, and

said data transfer comprising an authenticity/integrity verification.

In accordance with the first aspect of the invention, the data or document transfer from the first computer system to the second computer system is established by means of two coherent electronic cards, which by themselves ensure the necessary data transmission security during data transmission in encrypted form, as the use of two coherent electronic cards at the same time relative to both transmitter and receiver, guarantees that the data output from the second electronic card or the electronic document output from the second electronic card is identical to the data input into the first electronic card or the electronic document input into the first electronic card.

As the data transfer between the first and the second computer system is carried out between the first and the second electronic card, no third parties with or without authorization are able to interfere with the data transmission and change the data or the electronic document. As will be clear, this data or document transfer in accordance with the teaching of the invention is possible, without having to make any other modification in the connection between the first and the second computer system than the supplementing (which is characteristic to the invention) of both the first and the second computer system with associated input and output stations, which are used for input and output of data in the respective electronic cards belonging to the coherent set of cards. Such coherent set of cards can be issued immediately, hired out or sold by a neutral and outside card issuer, who thus without neither transmitter or receiver having to provide information about data transmission secrets such as encryption algorithms, security levels, etc., can enable the transmitter and the receiver to transfer data or electronic documents between the corresponding computer systems without any risk that the data received by the receiver or the electronic document received by the receiver is not identical to the

data sent by the transmitter or the electronic document sent by the transmitter.

In accordance with the present invention it is furthermore possible to ensure that the transfer takes place between computer systems, the authenticity of which is verified relative to one another, as a verification of the authenticity of the first electronic card relative to the second electronic card and vice versa is preferably made prior to the transfer of the data or the electronic document from the first computer system to the second computer system.

In accordance with the method according to the invention it is possible to verify that the data or document transfer is correct, i.e. to verify that the data received by the receiver or the second computer system or the electronic document received by the receiver or the second computer system is identical to the data sent from the first computer system or the electronic document sent from the first computer system, as in accordance with the invention a verification of the integrity of the data or document transfer is preferably made at the transfer of the data or the electronic document from the first computer system to the second computer system.

The utilization of a coherent set of electronic cards which is characteristic of the invention, via which the data and document transfer takes place, makes it possible for the data or document transfer to proceed completely autonomously without any possibility of interference or corrupting from neither the computer systems involved persons, including operators, who with or without authorization try to change the data or the electronic document being transferred, as in accordance with the method of the invention, the inputting into, the outputting from, the encryption and the decryption and possibly the authenticity and integrity verification are preferably controlled autonomously by the central data processing unit of the individual card.

In accordance with a special aspect of the present invention, the actual transfer of the data or the electronic document between the first and the second computer system is preferably made in accordance with the above-mentioned LECAM protocol either in encrypted or decrypted form.

According to a first embodiment of the above described authenticity verification it is preferred that

a first set of data being generated in said first electronic card, said set of data being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card and being encrypted in said first electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said first set of data being output from said first electronic card in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first electronic card, being transferred via said first station to said first computer system and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system to said data transmission line,

said first set of data being received by said second computer system in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second computer system, being transferred to said second electronic card via said second station and via said input/output gate of said second electronic card being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said first set of data received by said second computer system in encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said second electronic card and being decrypted in said second electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said first set of data received by said second computer system in encrypted form and decrypted in said second electronic card being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

a second set of data being generated in said second electronic card, said second set of data being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

a first combination of said first set of data received by said second computer system in encrypted form, decrypted and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card and said second set of data stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card being generated in said second electronic card, said first combination being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said first combination being encrypted in said second electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said first combination being output from said second electronic card in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said second electronic card, being transferred via said second station to said second computer system and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said second computer system to said data transmission line,

said first combination being received by said first computer system in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said first computer system, being transferred to said first electronic card via said first station and via said input/output gate of said first electronic card, being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said first combination received by said first computer system in encrypted form being output from said

internal storage of said first electronic card and being decrypted in said first electronic card by means of encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said first combination received by said first computer system in encrypted form and decrypted in said first electronic card being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said first combination stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card being decombined for producing a first set of data retransmitted to said first electronic card and a second set of data transferred to said first electronic card,

said first set of data retransmitted to said first electronic card and said second set of data transferred to said first electronic card being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said first set of data stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card being compared to said first set of data retransmitted to said first electronic card and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card for verification of identity between these sets of data for verification of the authenticity of said second electronic card relative to said first electronic card,

a third set of data being generated in said first electronic card, said third set of data being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

a second combination of said second set of data received in encrypted form by said first computer system, decrypted and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card and said third set of data stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card being generated in said first electronic card, said second combination being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said second combination being encrypted in said first electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said second combination being output from said first electronic card in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first electronic card, being transferred via said first station to said first computer system and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system to said data transmission line,

said second combination being received by said second computer system in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second computer system, being transferred to said second electronic card via said second station and via said input/output gate of said second electronic card, being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said second combination received by said second computer system in encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said second electronic card and being decrypted in said second electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said second combination received by said second computer system in encrypted form and decrypted being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said second combination stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card being decombined for producing a second set of data retransmitted to said second electronic card and third set of data transferred to said second electronic card,

said second set of data retransmitted to said second electronic card and said third set of data transferred to said second electronic card being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card, and

said second set of data stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card being compared to second set of data retransmitted to said second electronic card and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card for verification of identity between these sets of data for verification of the authenticity of said first electronic card relative to said second electronic card.

In this authenticity verification the first, the second and the third set of data serve in a unique and logical way relative to the first and the second electronic card to verify that the transfer of data or the electronic document has taken place correctly and thus that the data or the electronic document which is received by the second electronic card, is identical to the data sent by the first electronic card or the electronic document sent by the first electronic card and further to ensure that the transmitter and the receiver are authorized transmitter and received, respectively, and also that the transmitter and receiver are what they pretend to be.

According to a first embodiment of the invention the integrity verification is made by

a compacted version of said data or said electronic document being generated in said first computer system or said first electronic card, said compacted version being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

a compacted version of said data transferred to said second computer system or of said electronic docu-

ment transferred to said second computer system being generated in said second computer system or in said second electronic card, said compacted version being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said compacted version stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card being output from said internal storage of said first electronic card and encrypted in said first electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said compacted data or document version encrypted by said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card being output from said first electronic card via said input/output gate of said first electronic card, being transferred via said first station to said first computer system and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system to said data transmission line,

said encrypted and compacted data or document version transferred from said first computer system being received by said second computer system via said interfacing means of said second computer system, being transferred to said second electronic card via said second station and via said input/output gate of said second electronic card, being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said compacted data or document version received by said second computer system in encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said second electronic card and being decrypted in said second electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said decrypted, compacted data or document version received by said second computer system in encrypted form and decrypted by said second electronic card being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

a comparison of said compacted data or document version stored in said second electronic card and said decrypted, compacted data or document version received by said second computer system in encrypted form and decrypted being made in said second electronic card for verification of the integrity of or identity between said data transferred from said first computer system and said data received by said second computer system or of the integrity of or identity between said electronic document transferred from said first computer system and said electronic document received by said second computer system.

According to a further and alternative embodiment of the invention the integrity verification is made by

a compacted version of said data or said electronic document being generated in said first computer system or in said first electronic card, said compacted version being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

a compacted version of said data transferred to said second computer system or said electronic document transferred to said second computer system being generated in said second computer system or in said second electronic card, said compacted version being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said compacted version stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card being output from said internal storage of said second electronic card and encrypted in said second electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card or said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card,

said compacted data or document version encrypted by said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card being output from said second electronic card via said input/output gate of said second electronic card, being transferred via said second station to said second computer system and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said second computer system to said data transmission line,

said encrypted and compacted data or document version transferred from said second computer system being received by said first computer system via said interfacing means of said first computer system, being transferred to said first electronic card via said first station and via said input/output gate of said first electronic card, being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said compacted data or document version received by said first computer system in encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said first electronic card and being decrypted in said first electronic card by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

said decrypted, compacted data or document version received by said first computer system in encrypted form and decrypted by said first electronic card being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card,

a comparison of said compacted data or document version stored in said first electronic card and said decrypted, compacted data or document version received by said first computer system in encrypted form and

decrypted being made in said first electronic card for verification of the integrity of or identity between said data transferred from said first computer system and said data received by said second computer system or of the integrity of or identity between said electronic document transferred from said first computer system and said electronic document received by said second computer system.

In accordance with the presently preferred embodiment, the integrity verification is, however, made by transferring a compacted data or document version from the first electronic card to the second electronic card as well as from the second electronic card to the first electronic card and comparing both transferred, compacted data or document versions to stored, compacted data or document versions in the two electronic cards.

According to alternative embodiments of the method according to the invention, said alternative embodiments constituting combinations of the authenticity and integrity verifications, said transfer of said compacted data or document version generated in said first computer system or in said first electronic card from said first electronic card to said second electronic card is made simultaneously with said transfer of said data or said electronic document itself, said data or electronic document and said compacted data or document version being combined and encrypted as a whole before said transfer, or alternatively said transfer of said compacted data or document version generated in said second computer system or in said second electronic card from said second electronic card to said first electronic card is made simultaneously with a retransmission of said data or said electronic document received from said first electronic card from said second electronic card to said first electronic card, said data or electronic document to be retransmitted and said compacted data or document version being combined and encrypted as a whole before said transfer.

According to a combination of these alternative integrity and authenticity verifications, a simultaneous retransmission of said compacted data or document version received by said second electronic card and generated in said first computer system or in said first electronic card is made at said transfer of said compacted data or document version generated in said second computer system or in said second electronic card and said retransmission of said data or said electronic document from said second electronic card, both compacted data or document versions and said data or said electronic document to be retransmitted being combined and encrypted as a whole before said transfer.

The above stated objects are alternatively obtained in accordance with the invention by a method of the type defined above, which method in accordance with a second aspect of the invention is characterized in that for said transfer

a first station is used, which is secured against illegal entry, i.e. a so-called "tamper-proof" station, for outputting data from and inputting data into
a first card, said first station being connected to and communicating with said first computer system and furthermore being connected to said data transmission line via said first computer system and interfacing means, and said first station having a central processing unit, an internal storage, an input/output means for outputting data from and inputting data into said first card as well as an encryption/decryption means, and

a second station is used, which is secured against illegal entry, i.e. a so-called "tamper-proof" station, for outputting data from and inputting data into a second card, said second station being connected to and communicating with said second computer system and furthermore being connected to said data transmission line via said second computer system and interfacing means, and said second station having a central data processing unit, an internal storage, an input/output means for outputting data from and inputting data into said first card as well as an encryption/decryption means

said first and second card constituting a coherent set of cards comprising coherent data input into said cards concerning said coherent encryption/decryption keys stored in said internal storages of said corresponding stations,

said data or said electronic document being transferred to said first station and being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said first station,

said data or said electronic document being output from said internal storage of said first station and being encrypted in said first station by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first station and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first station,

said data or said electronic document being output from said first station to said first computer system in encrypted form and therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system to said data transmission line,

said data or said electronic document being received by said second computer system in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second computer system, being transferred to said second station, being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said second station,

said data or said electronic document received in encrypted form being decrypted in said second station by means of said encryption/-decryption means of said second station and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second station, and

said data or said electronic document in said second station being output from said second station after decryption to said second computer system.

This alternative method according to the second aspect of the invention is preferably in accordance with advantageous embodiments of the method implemented in accordance with the above stated embodiments of the method according to the first aspect of the present invention.

The present invention furthermore relates to a system for transferring data from a first computer system to a second computer system, which second computer system is autonomous in relation to said first computer system, via a data transmission line, in accordance with the first aspect of the invention, said system comprising a first station and a second station, which are connected to and communicate with said first and said second computer system, respectively, and which furthermore via said first and said second computer system, respectively, and corresponding interfacing means are connected to said data transmission line, as well as a first and a second electronic card, which system is characterized in that

said first and second electronic card being temporarily connected to or being detachable from the first and the second station, respectively,

said first and second electronic card each comprise a central data processing unit, an input/output gate for communication with said corresponding station, an encryption/decryption means as well as an internal storage and together constitute a coherent set of electronic cards comprising coherent secret key(s) previously stored in the internal storage of the cards, said secret keys being used as encryption/decryption keys or being used for generating coherent encryption/decryption keys, said encryption/decryption keys being input into the internal storage of said cards, and said secret key(s) and said coherent encryption/decryption keys generated by use of the secret key(s) only being handled within the electronic cards. The coherent set of cards used in this system according to the invention preferably comprises cards of the type DES Smart Card (Philips), Super Smart Card (Bull) or CP8 Smart Card (Bull) or at least a card implemented on a printed circuit card, a thick-film substrate, a thin-film module, etc.

The present invention furthermore relates to a system for transferring data, an electronic document or the like from a first computer system to a second computer system, said second computer system being autonomous relative to said first computer system, via a data transmission line, e.g. a public data transmission line, said system being characterized in that it comprises said first station and said second station, which are connected to and communicate with said first and said second computer system, respectively, and which furthermore via said first and said second computer system, respectively, and corresponding interfacing means are connected to said data transmission line, as well as said first and said second card, which constitute a coherent set of cards comprising said coherent data input into said cards concerning said coherent encryption/decryption keys stored in said internal storages of said corresponding stations. The coherent set of data, which is used according to the system and the method according to the second aspect of the invention can be a magnetic card as well as an electronic card which again can be of above-mentioned type. In accordance with this aspect of the invention, any other medium can furthermore be used.

The present invention furthermore relates to an electronic card comprising a central data processing unit, an internal storage, an input/output gate for communication with a associated station for outputting data from and inputting data into the electronic card as well as an encryption/decryption means, which card according to the invention constituting a first electronic card of a coherent set of cards comprising the first electronic card and a second electronic card, which electronic cards have coherent encryption/decryption keys and are designed to be used in accordance with a method according to the first aspect of the invention.

The encryption made according to the invention can be made according to arbitrary known technique and comprise symmetrical or asymmetrical encryption/decryption algorithms such as DES algorithms, RSA algorithms or the like. The encryption/decryption algorithms can furthermore be combined.

The invention will now be further described with reference to the drawing,
in which

Fig. 1 shows a system according to the invention comprising a first computer system and a second computer system communicating with each other via a data transmission line for carrying out the method according to the invention,

fig. 2 schematically shows the structure of the software of the system shown in fig. 1,

fig. 3 schematically shows a system according to the invention comprising two computer systems communicating with each other via a data transmission line, and furthermore a mini computer,

fig. 4 schematically shows an enlarged system comprising three computer systems, which according to the teaching of the invention communicate with each other via a data transmission line, and one of which furthermore communicates with two terminals or Minitels via appropriate interfacing means and the data transmission line,

fig. 5 shows a block diagram of an authenticity verification, and

fig. 6 shows a block diagram of an integrity verification.

In fig. 1, a system according to the invention for carrying out the method according to the invention is shown schematically, which system comprises two autonomous computer systems, a first computer system shown in the left-hand part of fig. 1 and designated the reference numeral 100 in its entirety, and a second computer system shown in the right-hand part of fig. 1 and designated the reference numeral 200 in its entirety. The two computer systems 100 and 200 are shown schematically comprising the same types of elements, which for the two computer systems are indicated by the same two last digits of the reference numerals, the reference numerals for elements belonging to the first computer system 100 beginning with the digit 1 and the reference numerals for elements belonging to the second computer system 200 beginning with the digit 2. The two computer systems 100 and 200 thus each comprises an "inhouse" main computer, 102, 202, respectively. These main computers 102 and 202 communicate via data lines 104, 204 with terminals or personal computers (PC's) 106, 206, which each comprises a keyboard 108, 208, a computer section 110, 210 and a computer screen 112, 212. The terminals or the PC's 106, 206 furthermore communicate with the associated diskette stations or optical disc store 114, 214 as well as hard disks 116, 216 with associated back-up diskette stations or optical disc store 118, 218. The terminals or the PC's 106, 206 are furthermore via respective data transmission lines 120, 220 connected to respective stations 122, 222 for input and output of data in respective electronic cards or chip cards, so-called Smart Cards, which are indicated by the reference numerals 124, 224.

Together with the associated peripheral equipment comprising the diskette stations or optical disc store 114, 214, the hard disks 116, 216, the back-up diskette stations or optical disc store 118, 218, the associated stations 122, 222 as well the associated electronic cards 124, 224, the terminals or the PC's 106, 206 are contained in the blocks 126, 226 indicated by dotted lines.

The task or object of the invention is to provide a possibility of transferring data from the first computer system to the second computer system, by which data transfer it is ensured that the data sent is identical to the data intended to be sent, that the data received is identical to the data sent, and preferably furthermore that the transfer only takes place between parties specifically intended to send and receive data, that receipt of the data is acknowledged by the receiver and furthermore that receipt of the receiver's acknowledgement is acknowledged by the sender relative to the receiver. In the following description, the data transfer is meant to take place from the first computer system 100 to the second computer system 200, but it is of course clear that the data transfer can also take place in the opposite direction. According to the invention the data transfer can furthermore consist in an exchange of data between the two computer systems, i.e. comprise a transfer of data from the first computer system 100 to the second computer system 200 and transfer of data from the second computer system 200 to the first computer system 100. Neither of the respective sides of the two computer systems 100 and 200 has any knowledge of security levels, transmission protocols, encryption/decryption algorithms etc. of the other computer system. Via interfacing means contained in the associated terminals or PC's 106, 206 and the associated data transmission lines 128, 228, the two computer systems 100 and 200 are connected to a public data transmission network, which is collectively indicated by the reference numeral 300. Instead of a public data transmission network, e.g. an X25 data network, the data transmission network 300 can be a private network or comprise combinations of public and private computer networks and furthermore via associated modems (modulators/demodulators) be connected to e.g. telephone lines or other signal or transmission lines.

In order to ensure that the above stated requirements for data transfer are met, the data transfer is made by the data to be transferred from the computer system 100 to the computer system 200 first being output from the main computer 102 of the computer system 100 to the terminal or the PC 106 and being transferred to the station 122. From the station 122 the data is transferred to the electronic card 124 via the input/output gate of this card, whereupon the data is processed exclusively by the electronic card 124. Similar to the card 224, the card 124 has in addition to the above-mentioned input/output gate, a central processing unit or CPU, an internal storage, an encryption/decryption block which controlled by the internal central processing unit of the card is able to encrypt and decrypt the data by outputting data from the card or by inputting data into the card, respectively, by use of one or more encryption/decryption keys input into the card in advance, as will be described in greater detail below in a detailed system/software description. For the transfer of data between the cards, the cards 124, 224 have been issued together and constitute a coherent set of cards being preprogrammed as regards encryption/decryption algorithms and keys in such a way that the cards are able to communicate with each other and decrypt data transferred from the first card to the second card and vice versa.

In the electronic card 124, an encryption of the data input is then made, the encrypted data is transferred via the station 122, the data transmission line 120, the terminal or the PC 106, the associated interfacing means and the data transmission line 128 to the data transmission network 300, from which the data via the data transmission line 228, the interfacing means of the terminal or the PC' 206, the terminal or the PC 206, the data transmission line 220 and the station 222 is transferred to the electronic card 224, in which the data is

decrypted by means of the encryption/decryption key(s) stored in the card corresponding to the encryption/decryption keys of the card 124. After decryption of the data in the card 224 the data can be output in clear text from the electronic card 224 to the station 222 and be transferred via the data transmission line 220, the terminal or the PC 206 and the data transmission line 204 to the main computer 202. As the data transfer from the first computer system 100 to the second computer system 200 only takes place between the two electronic cards 124 and 224 it is ensured that the data version output from the electronic card 224 is identical to the data version input into the electronic card 124. Hereby it is ensured that the data transferred to the second computer system 200 is identical to data intended to be sent from the first computer system 100, and seen from the point of view of the first computer 100 it is also ensured that the data version which the computer system 200 has received is identical to the data which was initially sent from the first computer system 100.

In the below system description it will furthermore be explained how an authenticity verification between the two electronic cards 124, 224 is made prior to the actual transfer and furthermore how acknowledgements containing compacted data versions are signed for integrity verification, which acknowledgements are transferred between receiver and sender, i.e. between the card 224 and the card 124.

In fig. 2 the software design of the main computers 102, 202 of the computer systems 100 and 200 and the terminals or PC's 106, 206 is shown schematically. It is to be realized that the software design is only intended to be illustrative and explanatory and in no way to be construed limiting the scope as defined in the appended claims. Each main software comprises an "inhouse" software 130, 230, a communications protocol 132, 232 for transfer of data to the associated terminal or PC 106, 206 via the data transmission lines 104, 204 (e.g. an asynchronous RS 232 communications protocol), two software converter or compiler blocks 134, 234 and 136, 236 for conversion or compiling from "inhouse" format to the transmission protocol determined by the block 132, 232 and from the transmission protocol determined by the block 132, 232 to "inhouse" format, respectively. The main computer software 102, 202 may further comprise a further block 138, 238, a so-called Edifact software, which will be described below.

The terminals or the PC's 106, 206 contain the following software blocks: a communications protocol 140, 240 for communication with the main computer 102, 202 via the data transmission line 104, 204, an internal central software 142, 242 controlling the functions of the terminal or the PC in question, a converter or compiler software 144, 244 corresponding to the software block 138, 238 of the main computer 102, 202, a communications protocol 146, 246, e.g. an X25 protocol, which protocols constitute the interfacing means of the terminal or the PC to the associated data transmission line 128, 228, a software block 148, 248 for communication with the associated peripheral equipment of the terminals or the PC's such as the diskette stations and hard disks 114, 214 and 116, 216 shown in fig. 1, a software block 150, 250 containing information regarding e.g. "black lists" etc. and finally a software block 152, 252 for communication with the associated station 122, 222. The PC program may further comprise a block corresponding to the blocks 138 and 238 discussed above and comprising Edifact software.

It is to be noted that the data transfer comprising authenticity/integrity verification etc., which is characteristic of the invention, can be implemented with an integrated circuit card constituting a combination of a station and an electronic card such as a combination of the station 122 and the card 124 or of the station 222 and the card 224. Such printed circuit cards are shown in the lower part of fig. 2 and designated the reference numerals 160 and 260, respectively. The printed circuit card 160, 260 thus constitutes a complementary card relative to the second printed circuit card or relative to an electronic card for use in connection with an associated station. Thus the printed circuit card 160 can be a circuit card complementary to the printed circuit card 260 or a card complementary to the electronic card 224. Correspondingly the printed circuit card 260 can be a card complementary to the electronic card 124 or a card complementary to the printer circuit card 160.

In a further alternative embodiment of the invention the above described data transfer from the electronic card 124 to the electronic card 224 can be established between corresponding security modules 170, 270, which are shown in the lower part of fig. 2. These security modules or security terminals constitute so-called "tamper-proof" stations, i.e. stations which due to their special physical design make it impossible to open the system and thus reveal material as well as software. Similar to the electronic cards 124, 224, these security modules contain an input/output gate, a central processing unit, internal storages and encryption/decryption blocks. In contrast to the electronic cards 124, 224 and the printed circuit cards 160, 260 integrating stations and cards, the internal storages of the security modules can contain more encryption/decryption keys, which are addressed to a given data transfer by means of a card, e.g. an electronic card or a magnetic card, which similar to the electronic cards 124, 224 and printer circuit card 160, 260 integrating stations and electronic cards are issued by a card issuer, who corresponding to the electronic card or magnetic card in question issues a corresponding magnetic card or an electronic card or a printed circuit card for use at data transfer from a security module addressed by the magnetic card in question to a security module addressed by an associated electronic card and finally to a printed circuit card or vice versa.

In fig. 3, a system which is enlarged as compared to the system shown in fig. 1 is shown schematically, and which in addition to the two computer systems 100 and 200 comprises a mini computer which is designated the reference numeral 306 in its entirety and has a keyboard 308, a central processing unit 310 and a computer screen 312. The mini computer system 306 can furthermore comprise peripheral equipment such as a diskette station or a tape station, a printer, etc. Such peripheral equipment is not shown in fig. 3. For transfer of data to one of the computer systems 100 or 200 or for reception of data from one of these computer systems in accordance with the teaching of the invention, the mini computer system 306 is connected to a station 322, corresponding to the stations 122, 222 shown in figs. 1, 2 and 3, via a data transmission line 320 corresponding to the data transmission lines 120 and 220 shown in fig. 1. Via a data transmission line 328 corresponding to the data transmission lines 128, 228 via an interfacing means contained in the central data processing unit 310 of the mini computer system and furthermore possibly via a modem, which is not shown in fig. 3, the mini computer system 306 is connected to a public telephone network 330. The public telephone network 330 is via a modem, which is neither shown in fig. 3, and a data transmission line 332 connected to a converter 346 containing converter or compiler sub-blocks 334, 336 corresponding to the software blocks 134, 234 and 136, 236 shown in fig. 2 and which via a data transmission line 338 is connected to the network 300.

By means of two coherent cards one of which is received in the station 322, and another one of which is received in the station 122 or 222 of the computer 100 or 200 respectively, it is possible in accordance with the teaching of the invention possible to transfer data to and from the mini computer system 306 from and to the computer system in question, respectively, the associated card station of which computer system has received an electronic card, not shown, corresponding to the electronic card received in the card station 322. Similar to the mini computer system 306, the computer system with which the mini computer is communicating can have its electronic card integrated with the corresponding station in a printed circuit card, similar to the printed circuit cards shown in fig. 2 and designated the reference numerals 160, 260 belonging to the computer systems 100, 200, or have a security module or security terminal which is addressable by means of an electronic card or a magnetic card as explained above.

In fig. 4 an alternative computer system configuration is shown which in addition to the above described computer system comprising the first computer system 100 and the second computer system 200 which are interconnected via the network 300, includes a number of mini computer systems, in the present case two mini computer systems 406 which are preferably so-called Minitel computers, communicating with an associated host which is shown in the upper central part of fig. 4 and designated the reference numeral 400 in its entirety, and which constitutes a computer system. The mini computer systems 406 and the host 400 constitute a so-called videotex system which will be explained in greater detail below in the system/software description. The communication between the Minitel computers 406 and the host 400 is preferably made in accordance with the LECAM protocol developed by FRANCE TELECOM. The computer system 400 constitutes a computer system corresponding to one of the computer system 100, 200, and between the computer system 400 and one of the computer systems 100, 200 data can be transferred both ways in the above described manner by means of two coherent cards, especially two coherent electronic cards. Thus the computer system 400 is basically of a structure equivalent to the structure of the computer systems 100, 200 and comprises a central processing unit 402, which is connected to a communications block 426 corresponding to the blocks 126, 226 via a data transmission line 404, which block 426 is connected to the network 300 via a data transmission line 428 corresponding to the data transmission lines 128, 228. The computer system 400 furthermore comprises a hard disk 460 or disc store, a computer screen 462 and a card reader 464. The card reader 464 is adopted to receive an electronic card of the above described kind, especially a so-called smart card, at transfer of data to and from the Minitel computer 406, as will be explained in greater detail below in the system/software description. The card reader or the station 464 on the other hand has no connection to the external computer systems 100, 200, as the data transfer between the computer system 400 and one of the computer systems 100, 200 is controlled by the communication block 426 in the above described way. The individual Minitel computers 406 has a keyboard 408, a computer screen 412 and a card reader 422, which like the card reader 464 is adopted to receive an electronic card, which makes it possible to transfer data to and from the Minitel computer 406 from and to the computer system 400, respectively. The connection from the individual Minitel computer 406 to the computer system 400 is established via a data transmission line 428 connecting the individual Minitel computer 406 to a public telephone network 430 by means of appropriate modem units, a connection from the public telephone network 430 to the computer system 400 being established via a first data transmission line 432, a converter or compiler 446 and a second data transmission line 438.

The Minitel computers shown in fig. 4 first of all serve the purpose of distributing electronic document "mail" internally within the Minitel system belonging to the computer system 400, as data or document transfer is made from the individual Minitel computer 406 via the public telephone network 430 and the network 300 by means of an electronic card issued by the institution which runs the computer system 400 to the station 464 of the

computer system 400. The computer system shown in fig. 4 furthermore provides the possibility of transferring data or documents from the individual Minitel computer 406 to the computer system 400, from which system data or documents can be transferred again to a second computer system, e.g. the computer system 100 or the computer system 200 via the data transfer block 426 with associated electronic cards, in accordance with the above described data transfer.

EXAMPLE

A computer system of the type shown in figures 1 and 2 was implemented with:

Personal Computer:

AT 10 MHz with 640 kbytes storage,
40 Mbyte hard disk, 2 serial RS232 gates, Danish keyboard, black/white screen including adapter.
Type: Philips P3204.
The following software was used:
MS-DOS operating system version 3.3.
Type: Microsoft
RTOS Real Time Operating System version 4.00.
Type: Dansk Informations Teknologi
X.25 Communication card - 16 gates:
Type: Stollmann SICC-PC-X25.
SmartCard reader with power supply and RS232 interface cable:
Type: Philips/Control Data Laserdrive 510 DT

For this system implementation, software was used developed by Netplus (©1989). The software is developed in C, Pascal and Assembler.

In the computer system, data and documents in encrypted and not encrypted form were furthermore exchanged between a Minitel terminal of the type shown in fig. 4 with the reference numeral 406 and a computer system of the above described type in accordance with the principles of the invention by means of the LECAM protocol developed by FRANCE TELECOM (©December 1987 - FRANCE TELECOM - TELETEL).

A detailed system and software specification will be described below concerning both data transfer from the first computer system to the second computer system, e.g. from the computer system 100 to the computer system 200, and data transfer to and from a Minitel computer 406 to and from the computer system 400, respectively.

System and software description:

The system has an interface to a large surrounding world, which is not under control under all circumstances. This implies that it must be ensured that unauthorized persons do not get unauthorized access to or insight into the system. Below, the security of the system is described and the requirements which are furthermore made to the system, so that this can be of practical use.

There are security systems which are impossible to break, but which are useless in practice, but also security systems which are commercially available and appear to be of practical use, but which unfortunately are also easy to break.

A number of security requirements which the system fulfils will be described now:

1. Large key room
2. No real or statistical possibility of finding a key on the basis of clear text and crypto text
3. No clear text in crypto text
4. Stratified structure of the transmission network

Re 1. The number of keys must be so large that it is not practically possible to find the right key by exhaustive search. It must be required that two different keys encrypt the same clear text into different crypto texts. Exactly how large the key room must be, naturally also depends on the resources which are available to a potential "enemy". For the transactions mentioned in this system, 56 bits as in DES are sufficient, as it on average will take at least 4 months to decipher a crypto text with the fastest available computer power. As a new key is used for each transmission, it will be practically impossible to obtain full insight.

Re 2. Even though many coherent clear text messages and corresponding crypto text messages are known, it must not be possible to determine the applied key on the basis of this.

Re 3. In the crypto text there must be no statistical significant trace of the clear text. If there is no such

trace, the "enemy's" only weapon is exhaustive search, if only the crypto text is available.

Re 4. The interface specifications for the transmission network via which the encrypted data or text has to be transmitted, normally also prescribe transmission of operational control information which should of course not be encrypted similar to address fields and the like for the data mentioned. Problems may arise, if the interfacing means does not have a stratified structure or if it is not quite clear at which level the encryption is to take place.

Use of chip cards and the DES algorithm provides a solution in which

1. the size of the key room is sufficient, especially as different keys are used for different transfers, and the key for exchange of encryption key is safely hidden in the chip card,
2. it has no practical value to find a key on the basis of both clear text and crypto text, as this key is only used for one transmission, and
3. DES encryption of the documents ensures that there is no clear text in the crypto texts.

When using chip card and DES algorithm in this way, the public X.25 network as well as a teletel videotex network are used. Both these networks facilitate a transparent transfer of encrypted text. There are various protocols for transfer, which are followed in connection with the document transfer. For the videotex network, the LECAM protocol is used.

Symmetrical/asymmetrical systems

Wherever possible, simple methods are used for securing data, however, without reducing the security. Accordingly a symmetrical system (e.g. DES) is preferred to an asymmetrical system (e.g. RSA), as an asymmetrical system, such as RSA requires far more computer power than a symmetrical system, such as DES. A symmetrical system, such as DES, on the other hand, requires greater security concerning keys. (Concerning DES and RSA see above).

1. Symmetrical crypto systems
2. Asymmetrical crypto systems
3. Speeds

Re 1. A symmetrical crypto system is characterized in that the same key is used for encryption and decryption. A much used and safe algorithm for this use is the DES algorithm.

The DES algorithm (Data Encryption Standard) was developed by IBM in cooperation with the National Bureau of Standards NBS) and published in 1977. DES is only used for civilian encryption and is today the most widespread crypto system. In particular, DES is very much used within the banking world, also in the "DANKORT"-system.

In the DES algorithm, encryption is made in blocks of 64 bits by means of a key of 56 bits. First, the 64 bits to be encrypted are subjected to a permutation, which serves to mix the bits, as input in the typical application consists of 8 bytes. Following this, 16 iterated encryptions are made by means of various keys, derived from the chosen key and the clear text, as the 64 bits before each iteration have been divided into a left-hand side Li and a right-hand side Ri, each consisting of 32 bits. In the i+1st iteration Ri is transferred as the next left-hand side Li+1, and the new right-hand side Ri+1 is produced as XOR of Li and 32 other bits, which appears as a complex, but completely described function of Ri and Ki+1, where Ki+1 is a key of 48 bits, which is derived from the chosen key of 56 bits.

The function itself can be described as follows: the 32 bits in Ri are changed to 48 bits by bitshifting and are then permuted. XOR of Ki+1 is generated. The resulting 48 bits are counted 6 at a time in 8 families, which by means of S-boxes are converted to 8 families with only 4 bit in each, so that 32 bits are delivered. After a fixed permutation of these, the above 32 bits are found.

After 16 iterations, the 64 bits are permuted with the inverse permutation of the initial one. This is necessary to ensure that the subsequent decryption of the crypto text can be made by simply performing the DES-algorithm again, but with the 16 derived keys in inverse order.

Re 2. The difference between a symmetrical crypto system and an asymmetrical crypto system is that it is not possible in an asymmetrical system by way of calculation to find the decryption key, even though the encryption key is known, and vice versa.

Instead of "encryption" and "decryption" it is therefore more correct to speak of a secret transformation key SK (Secret Key) and a public transformation key PK (Public Key). In particular, it is required for all messages, X that

$$PK(SK(X)) \rightarrow X \text{ and } SK(PK(X)) \rightarrow X$$

An asymmetrical crypto system can be used for both concealment and authenticity, and even for generation of digital signatures. It must, however, be pointed out that for each individual user A who chooses a key or rather a pair of keys (PA, SA), A can use SA for receipt of secret messages as well as for his own digital

signature and other persons' public keys to send concealed messages. In return, other persons can use A's public key to send concealed messages to A.

One of the best known asymmetrical crypto systems is the RSA crypto system (named after the fathers of the system: Rivest, Shamir and Adelman). It is based on experiences which mathematicians have obtained over several thousand years concerning prime numbers. It is relatively easy to decide whether a specific, chosen number n is a prime number or not, but if it turns out that it is not a prime number, the difficulties of finding the prime number divisors increase exponentially with the magnitude of the number. Even when using all the artifices which mathematicians have developed in the course of time, it has not been possible to find a simple way of deducing the prime number divisors. There are extremely many numbers of hundred digits or less (the limit today is about 90), which are practically impossible to resolve into prime factors.

In the RSA crypto system, the origin is two randomly chosen prime numbers p and q of approx. 100 digits each. These prime numbers must be strong prime numbers, which have the effect that it by means of known methods will take billions of years to find the divisors in n on the basis of $n = pq$ (p and q are kept secret). It is necessary that these properties are available because of the security of the system. Then a number e is chosen, which must be prime with $(p-1)(q-1)$. Knowing p and q it is possible to find another number d with the following properties:

Given a random number m less than n, the remainder of m^{de} (i.e. m multiplied by itself (d multiplied by e) times) by subsequent division of integers with n, will again give the number m.

It is possible in several ways to divide messages into blocks, which can be represented uniquely as numbers between 1 and n, e.g. by means of ASCII codes. A clear text m, represented in this way, is thereafter encrypted as

$$c = m^e \text{ modulus } n,$$

i.e. the remainder of m multiplied by itself e times, by subsequent division of integers with n.

Decryption of c is made by calculating

$$c^d \text{ modulus } n$$

which according to the above is equal to m.

The pair of numbers (e, n) can, of course, be used to specify a public key, viz. the key

$$P(m) = m^e \text{ modulus } n,$$

whereas the pair of numbers (d, n) specifies the secret key

$$S(x) = x^d \text{ modulus } n,$$

(it is only d, which must be kept secret, together with p and q).

Hereby a public key system results.

Re 3. An important requirement for crypto systems is often that a certain speed is guaranteed. Hardware equipment where the algorithm is stored in a specially designed chip, operates with far greater speed than software equipment. It may be a question of a factor of hundred or more, depending on the equipment.

As an example it is to be mentioned that DES in software in e.g. equipment with an INTEL 8086 processor and a clock frequency of 4,7 MHz encrypts at a speed of approx. a few thousand bits per second (there is a possibility of considerable variations depending on the implementation).

As regards software implementation of RSA the fastest 32 bit chips today, e.g. MOTOROLA 68030, with a clock frequency of 20 MHz, will produce an RSA block encryption of 512 bits in approx. 4. sec. and a decryption in approx. 1 sec. (by means of a minor mathematical artifice). By means of so-called "digital signal processing" chips, this can be reduced even further, presumably to 1 sec. or less for an encryption.

On the market today "black boxes" are available containing encryption chips, which can make an encryption with a high security level. One of these is a so-called SCP-box which in addition to being a Chipcard reader with keyboard for PIN-code control also comprises a display, a relatively fast CPU, 128 Kb RAM and the DES as well as RSA algorithms. The box is designed in such a way that it destroys itself when it is attempted to gain physical access to the electronics, i.e. it is so-called "tamper-proof" box. It has an encryption capacity of about 40,000 bytes per minute with the DES algorithm. By using this box the ability of the Chip card to store keys is used to ensure authenticity and by means of a table in the RAM storage in combination with the chip card, keys can be worked out, which are unique to the individual encryption and transfer of information.

Chip cards

From a cryptological point of view, the explosive development of very small chips has facilitated a very interesting development, viz. the chip card. This card has the same shape and size as a magnetic card, but contains furthermore as mentioned above a small processor and a small storage (typically 1-2 kbyte), which may e.g. be of the type EEPROM (Electrically Eraseable Programmable Read Only Memory), so that both input and output access can be obtained via a card reader.

Such a card is particularly suitable for storage of e.g. a secret key. It is furthermore possible to protect this key efficiently by an encryption controlled by a PIN code, and by securing the key so that it cannot be read from the card, but only be used for encryption and decryption. It is also possible to let the card destroy itself (logically) if a wrong PIN code is used more than e.g. three times, and to give it a definite lifetime (a certain number of applications).

Detailed description of chip cards

The chip card contains a micro processor, data and program storage and an I/O gate, secret information and protected information being hidden or stored in a data memory. As the I/O gate is controlled by the micro processor, all reading of information is controlled by the micro processor. Reading of secret data is not possible and reading of protected data is only possible after positive validation of the PIN code of the card. With correct PIN code it is possible to encrypt and decrypt data and to generate temporary keys. For encryption and decryption, the Data Encryption Standard (DES) is used. In addition to the operating system for the micro processor the program memory also contains the encryption algorithm DES. This has the result that the card can in fact be used to encrypt and decrypt data, even though it is quite a slow process (approx. 128 bytes per second).

The chip card in its present versions (DES Smart Card (Philips) and CP8 Smart Card (Bull)) can contain up to 1024 bytes information including various "headers". This corresponds to 500-800 bytes of user information, depending on the structure of the information in the card.

For different types of cards exist:

Batch card: this card is received together with the new cards and is used when personalizing these.

Root card: This card is used during the personalization to decrypt the application keys and the personal keys, before they are written into the chip card. This has the effect that the personal keys can be stored in a file in encrypted form and will only be known in the memory of the personalizing system during the execution of the personalization. The root card contains for each type of personal key a corresponding Root key.

Rehabilitation card: Is used when rehabilitating a Transaction card.

Transaction card: This is the card which is handed out to the users. It is used to store and protect personal keys and for generation of temporary keys for access control and encryption and decryption.

The lifetime of the chip card is divided into different phases:

1. Pre-personalization
2. Personalization
3. Active
4. End-of-life
5. Rehabilitation

Re 1. Pre-personalization

In this phase the card is empty apart from production information. The only information contained in the card at this time is a production key and information as to which "batch" the card belongs to. In order to obtain access to the memory of the card, it is necessary to know or gain access to the production key, which can only be obtained by having in one's possession the so-called Batch card which belongs to this particular "batch".

This ensures that only the holder of the Batch card can personalize cards and that the batch card holder only can personalize cards belonging to the "batch" in question.

Re 2. Personalization

When the production key is presented to the chip card, it is possible to input information into the memory. Information can e.g. be secret keys, DES identification, the names of the card holder and the card issuer, etc. When this phase is over, the card enters its active phase.

Re 3. Active

In this phase, the card is used by a user for encryption and decryption and for generating temporary keys. The card can be used until one of three situations appear:

a) The card is invalidated by an end-of-life instruction.

b) One the control zones of the card is full. The card contains three special zones: production key control zone, application key control zone and PIN control zone. In the first two zones a bit will be placed when

an error has been made when presenting a key. In the last zone a bit is placed, each time a check is made for the PIN code. If the last zone runs full, the card enters the end-of-life phase. This will happen after a maximum of 6000 presentations of the PIN code. The contents of this zone are reduced when user information and service keys are input into the card.

c) Three consecutive incorrect PIN code inputs cause the card to be locked. The card can be opened again by rehabilitation.

Re 4 End of life

In this phase, the card cannot be used. The card can be rehabilitated, if incorrect PIN code has been used.

Re 5. Rehabilitation

The card can be rehabilitated if the card holder still remembers the correct PIN code, otherwise not. Rehabilitation should be made by the card issuer and card holder jointly. In order to rehabilitate a chip card, a card is used which is specially designed for this purpose, viz. the rehabilitation card.

The design of the chip card provides a possibility of storing keys protected by PIN code, possibly encrypted and dedicated use of the keys (e.g. only decryption). At the same time the inputting of information and keys in a chip card depends on whether you have access to both the Root card and the Batch card, i.e. that only specific persons have access to input keys/information.

Administration of keys

One of the largest problems in connection with a crypto system of practical use is the actual handling of keys, as the keys are the "interface" of the system towards the users and constitute the weakest link of a system.

When a user is to have a key handed out or registered, it must be possible to identify him in a satisfactory way. The key is kept on a chip card, which can be allotted a definite lifetime, and which, as mentioned above, also destroys itself, when a wrong PIN code has been used three times.

The more a key is used, the greater the risk for the key becoming known. It is therefore necessary to change the key at frequent intervals. As the number of users becomes large, and arbitrary users must communicate with each other in encrypted form, the users are equipped with keys which are not used for data and file encryption, but only for exchange of the real encryption keys.

An administration is created around the security system and the handling of the keys, which

a) ensures that the used keys are kept secret,

b) ensures a possibility of being able to recreate used secret keys and provides a possibility of verifying that a certain key has been used for a specific purpose,

c) gives a simple and safe allocation of keys, and

d) prevents swindling with the allocation of chip cards by a stable and hermetic procedure.

The procedures for setting up the keys in connection with a chip card comprise:

1. Generation of keys
2. Inputting keys and desired information into chip cards
3. Distribution of cards
4. Renewal/withdrawal of cards

Re 1. Generation of cards

The keys for inputting information into the chip card are generated in such a way that they are both different and generated from random numbers. Accordingly, it is not possible to predict or guess the value of a key. In order to start the program for generating keys, a chip card must be presented (secured by a PIN code). The keys generated are stored in encrypted form in a file by means of this card.

Re 2. Inputting keys and desired information into the chip card

The data (keys and possible information) which are to be input into the cards, as provided by an application from the file in which they were arranged previously. The application sees to it that this data can only be transferred from the encrypted file to a chip card by two different persons with two different chip cards each having its own PIN code. The first card is a card which has been alloted to the card issuer and the contents of which

are known exclusively by the manufacturer producing the "empty" chip cards. The second card is a card which follows the batch of cards being prepared. Accordingly, the person(s) generating the keys and the information has/have no possibility of inputting the keys and the information into the chip cards. On the other hand, the person(s) inputting the data into the chip cards has/have no possibility of learning what is being input into the cards. When the cards are being prepared, a logging to an encrypted file will be carried out. This file will be error tolerant and the mirror of an alternative physical position. The file will be secured by means of an appropriate security routine.

Re 3. Distribution of cards

Traditionally, the cards are issued to the users in batches. The card is sent separately and the PIN code is sent separately. The PIN code is sent or delivered after accept of receipt of the card.

Re 4. Renewal/withdrawal of cards

When a card has run out for one reason or another, it must be returned to the card issuer as far as possible. The card issuer destroys it and possibly issues a new card to replace the old card. For security reasons it is preferred that when changing cards, a new card is produced which is different in terms of the input keys from the card which has run out. If a user ceases to use the chip card, the card must be returned to the card issuer. Under all circumstances the card is blocked electronically. A possibility of blocking the card at the first presentation after the blocking can be input.

Observation of these precautions ensures

that one person alone cannot produce a chip card, that only the card issuer can input information and keys, that keys can be produced at any time for verification of the use of a card which has run out and that the right user gets possession of the cards without any risk that the card is used by unauthorized persons.

Authenticity

The authenticity, i.e. security that the parties involved, transmitter/receiver are who they pretend to be, can be ensured in various ways, depending on whether the system is

1. a symmetrical system or
2. an asymmetrical system

Re 1. Symmetrical crypto system

In order to ensure that a transmitter (A) and a receiver (B) are who they pretend to be, A sends a number in encrypted form to B, and B verifies that the number comes from A. Then B sends a combination of a part of the number which B received from A, together with a number generated by B in encrypted form to A. A can hereafter verify that the combination has come from B, and at the same time A can check the part of the number which was generated by A. A now encrypts the number which A received from B and sends it back to B, who after verification can see that B has received the same combination as B sent to A. Below, it is outlined how a chip card can be used to ensure authenticity. When using the symmetrical crypto system a faint risk must be anticipated of a key being broken and data being read by third parties. This risk arises if a former member of the system with a thorough knowledge of the type of initial exchange of messages is in possession of a valid chip card and if this member taps the connection between transmitter and receiver and is in possession of the used crypto program.

Such a person will be able to decrypt the documents which are exchanged, encrypted with the described key in the transmission in question. However, it will not be possible to change the contents of the document and a renewed deciphering will also have to be made when tapping the next document transfer, as a new key is used for this transfer.

In the system according to the invention, a chip card reader 122, 222 and 426, respectively, is connected to each computer system or each host, the computer systems 100, 200 and 400.

The two computer systems constituting transmitter and receiver, the computer systems 100 and 200, respectively, shown in fig. 1-4, are equipped with authorized chip cards and are authorized to use these.

Each card 122 and 222 has two service zones for this purpose: A service zone with a "Verification key" (Vk) which is used to verify that the encryption which the opposite party has used is correct.

A service zone with a "Signature key" (Sk) which is used for encryption of the communication.
Vk can only be used for decryption and Sk can only be used for encryption.
In the procedure shown in fig. 5, the following abbreviations are used:

VkA :	Verification key for A or the computer system 100
SkA :	Signature key for A or the computer system 100
VkB :	Verification key for B or the computer system 200
SkB :	Signature key for B or the computer system 200
E :	Encryption
D :	Decryption
R1, R2, R3:	Random numbers
M1, M2, M3:	Transferred messages
IdA :	The publicly known identification for A or the computer system 100
IdB :	The publicly known identification for B or the computer system 200

The procedure appears from fig. 5.

Re 2. Asymmetrical crypto system

The authenticity verification described above with reference to fig. 5 is solely based on the application of an encryption system based on DES, but for the sake of completeness, the asymmetrical system is briefly described below.

If A or the computer 100 is to send a clear text M, which is to be kept secret when being transmitted, to B or the computer system 200, A uses B's public key PB, which B has made public to everyone, and sends

$$PB(M) \rightarrow C$$

Only B can decrypt, as only B knows his private key and $SB(C) \rightarrow M$.

If A is to send a clear text X to B in encrypted form in such a way that B can check that the message comes from A, A sends

$$SA(X) \rightarrow Y.$$

B then tries with A's public key PA and finds

$$PA(Y) \rightarrow X$$

If X is meaningful, then SA must have been used, as only A can encrypt in such a way that PA can decrypt into anything meaningful. It should be noted that authenticity is only ensured the first time the message X is signed. In practice therefore, such a message must be unique, e.g. by indicating the time of the day.

Both properties can be obtained in the following way:

If A wishes to send M to B, so that B is sure that the message comes from A at the same time ensuring that only B of all people can decrypt the message, A sends

$$PB(SA(M) \rightarrow C.$$

The only way in which M can be deduced as follows:

$$PA(SB(C)) \rightarrow M$$

Integrity

The integrity ensures that data is not changed during or after a concluded transmission. This is ensured by calculating the transmitter's (A) signature and the receiver's (B) signature, adding these to the document and having both A and B verify these signatures. With the DES algorithm, signatures are produced which can be encrypted and verified by means of chip card:

In the system according to the invention, a chip card reader is connected to each computer system or each host. The two computer systems constituting transmitter and receiver, 100 and 200 respectively, shown in fig. 1-4, are equipped with authorized chip cards and are authorized to use these.

For this purpose, each card has three service zones:

- A service zone with a so-called "Verification key" (Vk), which is used for verifying the signature which the opposite party has added to the document.
- A service zone with a "Signature key" (Sk) which is used to encrypt the signature.
- A service zone with a "Compression key" (Ck) which is used to produce the signature (MAC).

Vk can only be used for decryption and Sk can only be used for encryption. Ck is identical in all chip cards and can be used for compacting the document to the signature.

In the procedure shown in fig. 6, the following abbreviations are used:

VkA:	Verification key for A or the computer system 100
SkA:	Signature key for A or the computer system 100

MacA:	The compacted document seen from A's side
EmacA:	The encrypted MacA
VkB:	Verification key for B or the computer system 200
SkB:	Signature key for B or the computer system 200
MacB:	The compacted document seen from B's side
EmacB:	The encrypted MacB
Ck:	Compression key
E:	Encryption
D:	Decryption
C:	Compression
R1:	Random numbers exchanged previously
M1, M2, M3:	Transferred messages
IdA:	The publicly known identification for A
IdB:	The publicly known identification for B

The procedure appears from fig. 6

The integrity is ensured as both transmitter and receiver are certain that (have a possibility of checking) that the document has not been changed before or after the transmission without possible changes being unambiguously ascertainable. The function *A2 is built up in such a way that the chip card can produce a key by means of a publicly known identification which can decrypt the encrypted B/Mac and thus provide a basis for checking that the Mac which is added to the document is valid, i.e. calculated on the basis of the document received by the expected transmitter. The same applies in the opposite direction to the function *B2.

It is important that the Mac's produced are hidden in the document, as they are the unique signatures of the parties.

Security of access to the videotex system is shown in fig. 4

This security is ensured by using chip cards for automatic log-on to the videotex system:

1. Automatic presentation of identification and password
2. Encryption of communication between terminal and videotex server
2. Security in the videotex server as regards the individual user's access to the individual mail boxes and the applications of the system.

Re 1. Automatic presentation of identification and password

A chip card reader 422 of the type LECAM connected to a Minitel 409 has an intelligence which has the effect that it reads in a certain position on the card searching for data for an automatized dialling. When the dialling has been made, the application which is running on the videotex system will transfer a program to the RAM storage of the chip card reader. This program will then find identification and password in the card, ask for the PIN code to be entered and communicate with the application on the videotex server. If the PIN code is stated incorrectly, the program has no possibility of collecting information in the chip card.

Re 2. Encryption of communication between terminal and videotex server

The program which is transferred to the chip card reader, finds the key which is to be used for encryption, by looking up the chip card. The videotex application looks up a table in the host or the computer system 400 and finds a corresponding key. Encryption is made on the basis of this key for the whole communication between Minitel 400 and Host 400. It is expedient to use this encryption key to encrypt the exchange of the randomly chosen key which is used for encryption of the rest of the communication, as this has the result that a different encryption key is used for each individual communication.

Re 3. Security in the videotex server as regards the individual user's access to the individual mail boxes and the applications of the system

The access to mail boxes, data and applications in the videotex server is ensured by the "log-on" which is made on the basis of the information residing in the chip card. As the exchange of identification and password takes place in encrypted form, it will not be possible by tapping the line and the terminal to reconstruct these.

In other words, it will not be possible to get in contact with the mail boxes without possessing a chip card with a secret PIN code (which is only found in the card).

After access has been obtained to the video tex system, it is secured that access cannot be obtained to a basic host computer. This is done to avoid that data hackers by an error in the video tex system can obtain access to the operating system of the host computer.

Security when exchanging documents

The security system sees to it that documents which are built up according to the EDIFACT standard can be transferred securely between connected hosts.

It is ensured

1. that the documents can be endorsed with signature,
2. that the documents cannot be forged,
3. that the documents can only be read by/transferred to the person authorized, and
4. that it is possible to produce unambiguous evidence in connection with a possible dispute

Re 1. The documents can be endorsed with a signature

The transmitter goes through the document or parts thereof in order to generate an abbreviated expression of the document (e.g. a 64 bit key). This expression contains at least a serial number, date, time and all the sensitive data. This expression is encrypted by a chip card with a key which is found in the card and which cannot be read but only used for encryption or decryption in the card. The encrypted result (MAC = Message Authentification Code) is unique to this document and this transmitter, and the MAC is added to the document, whereupon it is ready for "dispatch".

Re 2. The documents cannot be forged

If changes are made in the document after the transfer is considered to be concluded, it will be possible to ascertain this, as the MAC's which are included in the document can be validated, whereupon the document is accepted or considered as invalid.

Re 3. The documents can only be read by/transferred to the authorized person

Both transmitter and receiver make sure that they are in contact with the right person, whereupon the document is encrypted by means of a key which is known by transmitter and receiver exclusively and which is arbitrary and only applies to this one transfer.

Re 4. Possibility of producing unambiguous evidence in connection with a possible dispute (MAC)

This is ensured by the card issuer's keeping the issued keys in a satisfactory way so that it can be decided at any time whether there is identity between a document and the associated MAC's.

EDIFACT definition

EDIFACT (Electronic Data Interchange For Administration, Commerce and Transport) is a standardised method of electronic transfer of all business related documents, which have an organized structure. The standard - which is approved by ISO (International Standard Organization) - is meant for exchange of documents between computer systems on both a domestic and a foreign level; the standard is therefore not dependent on language. The standard does not prescribe how the actual network communication must be carried out; it is a technically independent standard.

An EDIFACT document can be divided into certain parts or modules, which are called segments. Each segment has a specific purpose in the document in question, and the position of the segment in the message is prescribed by the standard for the document type in question. All segments are identified by a 3-letter code as prescribed by the standard. A message consists of many different segments which together contain all the information which is necessary to create the document.

A segment may e.g. look like this:

CUX+DEM:IN'

CUX is a segment head; CUX means type of currency + is a data element punctuation mark

DEM means German marks - the value can be anything else; arbitrarily definable as long as both transmitter and receiver agree to the meaning of the codes
: is a data component punctuation mark
IN is an abbreviation of INvoice - also arbitrarily definable
' designates the end of a segment

The contents of a segment can be divided into data elements. A data element is divided into one or more data components. In the above example with the segment CUX, only one data element is found. This data element consists of 2 data components, viz DEM and IN.
: is the punctuation mark separating coherent data components, whereas + is the separator for the individual data elements in a segment. This technique of describing information in a document is general and is used in all EDIFACT segments.

The data which follows a given segment head, is defined in the standard and is therefore unalterable. It is, however, not all data which is compulsory - quite a few can be omitted depending on the need.

To a very large extent, codes are used in the individual segments. By this is meant e.g. DEM in the above example which means German marks.

Both parties to the communication (transmitter and receiver) must agree to the application of these, as these are not covered by the standard.

Claims

1. A method of transferring data from a first computer system (100) to a second computer system (200) via a data transmission line (128, 228) wherein for said transfer

a first station (122) is used for outputting data from a first electronic card (124), said first station being (122) connected to and communicating with said first computer system (100) and furthermore being connected to said data transmission line (128, 228) via said first computer system (100) and interfacing means,

a second station (222) is used for outputting data from a second electronic card (224), said second station (222) being connected to and communicating with said second computer system (200) and furthermore being connected to said data transmission line (128, 228) via this second computer system (200) and interfacing means,

said data being transferred in encrypted form via said first station (122) to said first computer system (100) and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system (100) to said data transmission line (128, 228), and

said data being received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second computer system (200),

characterized in that

said first and second electronic card (124, 224) being temporarily connected to or being detachable from the first and the second station (122, 222), respectively,

said first and second electronic card (124, 224) each comprise a central data processing unit, an input/output gate for communication with said corresponding station (122, 222), an encryption/decryption means as well as an internal storage and together constitute a coherent set of electronic cards (124, 224) comprising coherent secret key(s) previously stored in the internal storage of the electronic cards (124, 224), said secret key(s) being used as encryption/decryption keys or being used for generating coherent encryption/decryption keys, said encryption/decryption keys being input into the internal storage of said electronic cards (124, 224), and said secret key(s) and said coherent encryption/decryption keys generated by use of the secret key(s) only being handled within the electronic cards (124, 224),

said data being transferred to said first electronic card (124) from said first computer system (100) via said first station (122) and said input/output gate of said first electronic card (124), being input into and being temporarily stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

said data being output from said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) and being encrypted in said first electronic card (124) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card (124) and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124), and said data being output from said first electronic card (124) in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first electronic card (124) before said transfer of encrypted data from said first computer system (100) to said second computer system (200),

said transferred encrypted data being transferred from said second computer system (200) to said second electronic card (224) via said second station (222) and via said input/output gate of said second

DEM means German marks - the value can be anything else; arbitrarily definable as long as both transmitter and receiver agree to the meaning of the codes
: is a data component punctuation mark
IN is an abbreviation of INvoice - also arbitrarily definable
' designates the end of a segment

The contents of a segment can be divided into data elements. A data element is divided into one or more data components. In the above example with the segment CUX, only one data element is found. This data element consists of 2 data components, viz DEM and IN.
: is the punctuation mark separating coherent data components, whereas + is the separator for the individual data elements in a segment. This technique of describing information in a document is general and is used in all EDIFACT segments.

The data which follows a given segment head, is defined in the standard and is therefore unalterable. It is, however, not all data which is compulsory - quite a few can be omitted depending on the need.

To a very large extent, codes are used in the individual segments. By this is meant e.g. DEM in the above example which means German marks.

Both parties to the communication (transmitter and receiver) must agree to the application of these, as these are not covered by the standard.

Claims

1. A method of transferring data from a first computer system (100) to a second computer system (200) via a data transmission line (128, 228) wherein for said transfer

a first station (122) is used for outputting data from a first electronic card (124), said first station being (122) connected to and communicating with said first computer system (100) and furthermore being connected to said data transmission line (128, 228) via said first computer system (100) and interfacing means,

a second station (222) is used for outputting data from a second electronic card (224), said second station (222) being connected to and communicating with said second computer system (200) and furthermore being connected to said data transmission line (128, 228) via this second computer system (200) and interfacing means,

said data being transferred in encrypted form via said first station (122) to said first computer system (100) and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system (100) to said data transmission line (128, 228), and

said data being received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second computer system (200),

characterized in that

said first and second electronic card (124, 224) being temporarily connected to or being detachable from the first and the second station (122, 222), respectively,

said first and second electronic card (124, 224) each comprise a central data processing unit, an input/output gate for communication with said corresponding station (122, 222), an encryption/decryption means as well as an internal storage and together constitute a coherent set of electronic cards (124, 224) comprising coherent secret key(s) previously stored in the internal storage of the electronic cards (124, 224), said secret key(s) being used as encryption/decryption keys or being used for generating coherent encryption/decryption keys, said encryption/decryption keys being input into the internal storage of said electronic cards (124, 224), and said secret key(s) and said coherent encryption/decryption keys generated by use of the secret key(s) only being handled within the electronic cards (124, 224),

said data being transferred to said first electronic card (124) from said first computer system (100) via said first station (122) and said input/output gate of said first electronic card (124), being input into and being temporarily stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

said data being output from said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) and being encrypted in said first electronic card (124) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card (124) and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124), and said data being output from said first electronic card (124) in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first electronic card (124) before said transfer of encrypted data from said first computer system (100) to said second computer system (200),

said transferred encrypted data being transferred from said second computer system (200) to said second electronic card (224) via said second station (222) and via said input/output gate of said second

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electronic card (224) and being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said data being output from said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) in encrypted form and being decrypted in said second electronic card (224) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card (224) and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said data being output after decryption in said second electronic card (224) from said second electronic card (224) and output to said second computer system (200) via said input/output gate of said second electronic card (224) and via said second station (222),

said data being transferred from the first computer system (100) to the second computer system (200) without exchanging any secret keys between the computer systems (100, 200), and

said data transfer comprising an authenticity/integrity verification.

2. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that verification of the authenticity of said first electronic card (124) relative to said second electronic card (224) and vice versa is made prior to said transfer of said data from said first computer system (100) to said second computer system (200).

3. A method according to any of the preceding claims, characterized in that said inputting into, said outputting from, said encryption and said decryption and possibly said authenticity and integrity verification being controlled auto-nomously by said central data processing unit of said individual card (124, 224).

4. A method according to any of the preceding claims, characterized in that said transfer of said data being made in accordance with the LECAM protocol.

5. A method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that said authenticity verification being made by

a first set of data (R1) being generated in said first electronic card (124), said set of data (R1) being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) and being encrypted in said first electronic card (124) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card (124) and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

said first set of data (R1) being output from said first electronic card (124) in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first electronic card (124), being transferred via said first station (122) to said first computer system (100) and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system (100) to said data transmission line (128, 228),

said first set of data (R1) being received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second computer system (200), being transferred to said second electronic card (224) via said second station (222) and via said input/output gate of said second electronic card (224) being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said first set of data (R1) received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) and being decrypted in said second electronic card (224) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card (224) and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said first set of data (R1) received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form and decrypted in said second electronic card (224) being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

a second set of data (R2) being generated in said second electronic card (224), said second set of data (R2) being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

a first combination (R1, R2) of said first set of data (R1) received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form, decrypted and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) and said second set of data (R2) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) being generated in said second electronic card (224), said first combination being (R1, R2) input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said first combination (R1, R2) being encrypted in said second electronic card (224) by means o f said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card (224) and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said first combination (R1, R2) being output from said second electronic card (224) in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said second electronic card (224), being transferred via said second station (222) to said second computer system (200) and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing

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means of said second computer system (200) to said data transmission line (128, 228),

said first combination (R1, R2) being received by said first computer system (100) in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said first computer system (100), being transferred to said first electronic card (124) via said first station (122) and via said input/output gate of said first electronic card (124), being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

said first combination (R1, R2) received by said first computer system (100) in encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) and being decrypted in said first electronic card (124) by means of encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card (124) and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

said first combination (R1, R2) received by said first computer system (100) in encrypted form and decrypted in said first electronic card (124) being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124), said first combination (R1, R2) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) being decombined for producing a first set of data (R1) retransmitted to said first electronic card (124) and a second set of data (R2) transferred to said first electronic card (124),

said first set of data (R1) retransmitted to said first electronic card (124) and said second set of data (R2) transferred to said first electronic card (124) being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

said first set of data (R1) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) being compared to said first set of data (R1) retransmitted to said first electronic card (124) and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) for verification of identity between these sets of data for verification of the authenticity of said second electronic card (224) relative to said first electronic card (124),

a third set of data (R3) being generated in said first electronic card (124), said third set of data (R3) being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

a second combination (R2, R3) of said second set of data (R2) received in encrypted form by said first computer system (100), decrypted and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) and said third set of data (R3) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) being generated in said first electronic card (124),

said second combination (R2, R3) being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124), said second combination (R2, R3) being encrypted in said first electronic card (124) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card (124) and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

said second combination (R2, R3) being output from said first electronic card (124) in encrypted form via said input/output gate of said first electronic card (124), being transferred via said first station (122) to said first computer system (100) and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system (100) to said data transmission line (128, 228),

said second combination (R2, R3) being received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form via said interfacing means of said second computer system (200), being transferred to said second electronic card (224) via said second station (222) and via said input/output gate of said second electronic card (224), being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said second combination (R2, R3) received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) and being decrypted in said second electronic card (224) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card (224) and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said second combination (R2, R3) received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form and decrypted being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said second combination (R2, R3) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) being decombined for producing a second set of data (R2) retransmitted to said second electronic card (224) and third set of data (R3) transferred to said second electronic card (224),

said second set of data (R2) retransmitted to said second electronic card (224) and said third set of data (R3) transferred to said second electronic card (224) being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224), and

said second set of data (R2) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) being compared to said second set of data (R2) retransmitted to said second electronic card (224) and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) for verification of identity between these sets of data for verification of the authenticity of said first electronic card (124) relative to said sec-

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ond electronic card (224).

6. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that said integrity verification being made by

a compacted version of said data being generated in said first computer system (100) or said first electronic card (124), said compacted version being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

a compacted version of said data transferred to said second computer system (200) being generated in said second computer system (200) or in said second electronic card (224), said compacted version being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said compacted data version stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) being output from said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) and encrypted in said first electronic card (124) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card (124) and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

said compacted data version encrypted by said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card (124) being output from said first electronic card (124) via said input/output gate of said first electronic card (124), being transferred via said first station (122) to said first computer system (100) and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said first computer system (100) to said data transmission line (128, 228),

said encrypted and compacted data version transferred from said first computer system (100) being received by said second computer system (200) via said interfacing means of said second computer system (200), being transferred to said second electronic card (224) via said second station (222) and via said input/output gate of said second electronic card (224), being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said compacted data version received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form being output from said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) and being decrypted in said second electronic card (224) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card (224) and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said decrypted, compacted data version received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form and decrypted by said second electronic card (224) being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

a comparison of said compacted data version stored in said second electronic card (224) and said decrypted, compacted data version received by said second computer system (200) in encrypted form and decrypted being made in said second electronic card (224) for verification of the integrity of or identity between said data transferred from said first computer system (100) and said data received by said second computer system (200).

7. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that said integrity verification being made by

a compacted version of said data being generated in said first computer system (100) or in said first electronic card (124), said compacted version being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

a compacted version of said data transferred to said second computer system (200) being generated in said second computer system (200) or in said second electronic card (224), said compacted version being input into and stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said compacted version stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) being output from said internal storage of said second electronic card (224) and encrypted in said second electronic card (224) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card (224) and said encryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said second electronic card (224),

said compacted data version encrypted by said encryption/decryption means of said second electronic card (224) being output from said second electronic card (224) via said input/output gate of said second electronic card (224), being transferred via said second station (222) to said second computer system (200) and being transferred therefrom via said interfacing means of said second computer system (200) to said data transmission line (128, 228),

said encrypted and compacted data version transferred from said second computer system (200) being received by said first computer system (100) via said interfacing means of said first computer system (100), being transferred to said first electronic card (124) via said first station (122) and via said input/output gate of said first electronic card (124), being input into and temporarily stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

said compacted data version received by said first computer system (100) in encrypted form being

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output from said internal storage of said first electronic card (124) and being decrypted in said first electronic card (124) by means of said encryption/decryption means of said first electronic card (124) and said decryption key(s) stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

said decrypted, compacted data version received by said first computer system (100) in encrypted form and decrypted by said first electronic card (124) being input into and stored in said internal storage of said first electronic card (124),

a comparison of said compacted data version stored in said first electronic card (124) and said decrypted, compacted data version received by said first computer system (100) in encrypted form and decrypted being made in said first electronic card (124) for verification of the integrity of or identity between said data transferred from said first computer system (100) and said data received by said second computer system (200).

8. A method according to claims 6 and 7, characterized in that a transfer of a compacted data version from said first electronic card (124) to said second electronic card (224) as well as from said second electronic card (224) to said first electronic card (124) and a comparison of both transferred, compacted data versions and stored, compacted data versions in said two electronic cards (124, 224) are made for said integrity verification.

9. A method according to claim 6 or 8, characterized in that said transfer of said compacted data version generated in said first computer system (100) or in said first electronic card (124) from said first electronic card (124) to said second electronic card (224) being made simultaneously with said transfer of said data itself, said data and said compacted data version being combined and encrypted as a whole before said transfer.

10. A method according to claim 7 or 8, characterized in that said transfer of said compacted data version generated in said second computer system (200) or in said second electronic card (224) from said second electronic card (224) to said first electronic card (124) being made simultaneously with a retransmission of said data received from said first electronic card (124) from said second electronic card (224) to said first electronic card (124), said data to be retransmitted and said compacted data version being combined and encrypted as a whole before said transfer.

11. A method according to claim 8, characterized in that said transfer from said second electronic card (224) to said first electronic card (124) of said compacted data version generated in said second computer system (200) or in said second electronic card (224) being made simultaneously with a retransmission from said second electronic card (224) to said first electronic card (124) of said compacted data version received by said second electronic card (224), said transfer and retransmission of compacted data versions also being made simultaneously with a retransmission from said second electronic card (224) to said first electronic card (124) of said data received by said second electronic card (224), said data to be retransmitted and both compacted data versions being combined and encrypted as a whole before said transfer.

12. A method according to claim 5, characterized in that

the encryption key used for encrypting the first set of data (R1) and the second combination (R2, R3) is made by use of a first signature key (SkA) stored in the first electronic card (124),

the decryption key used for decrypting the encrypted form of the first set of data (R1) and the encrypted form of the second combination (R2, R3) is made by use of a second verification key (VkB) stored in the second electronic card (224) and a publicly known identification (IdA) of the first electronic card (124),

the encryption key used for encrypting the first combination (R1, R2) is made by use of a second signature key (SkB) stored in the second electronic card (224), and

the decryption key used for decrypting the encrypted form of the first combination (R1, R2) is made by use of a first verification key (VkA) stored in the first electronic card (124) and a publicly known identification (IdB) of the second electronic card (224).

13. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that encryption and decryption keys used for encrypting and decrypting the transferred data are made by use of a first set of data (R1) generated in an authenticity verification which is made prior to the transfer of the data as described in claim 5.

14. A method according to claim 9, characterized in that

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the compacted data version is encrypted by use of a first signature key (SkA), which is stored in the first electronic card (124), before being combined with the data and further encrypted as a whole, and

the encrypted compacted data version is decrypted by use of a second verification key (VkB) stored in the second electronic card (224) and a publicly known identification (IdA) of the first electronic card (124) after the combination of the data and the compacted data version has been transferred and decrypted as a whole.

15. A method according to claim 9, characterized in that encryption and decryption keys used for encrypting and decrypting the combination of the data and the compacted data version are made by use of a first set of data (R1) generated in an authenticity verification which is made prior to the transfer of the data as described in claim 5.

16. A method according to claim 10, characterized in that

the compacted data version is encrypted by use of a second signature key (SkB), which is stored in the second electronic card (224), before being combined with the data to be retransmitted and further encrypted as a whole, and

the encrypted compacted data is decrypted by use of a first verification key (VkA) stored in the first electronic card (124) and a publicly known identification (IdB) of the second electronic card (224) after the combination of the data to be retransmitted and the compacted data version has been transferred and decrypted as a whole.

17. A method according to claim 10, characterized in that encryption and decryption keys used for encrypting and decrypting the combination of the data to be retransmitted and the compacted data version are made by use of a first set of data (R1) generated in an authenticity verification which is made prior to the transfer of the data as described in claim 5.

18. A method according to any of the claims 13, 15 or 17, characterized in that the authenticity verification further comprises the method of claim 12.

19. A method according to claim 8, characterized in that

said transfer from said first electronic card (124) to said second electronic card (224) of said compacted data version generated in said first computer system (100) or in said first electronic card (124) being made simultaneously with said transfer of said data itself, said data and said compacted data version being combined and encrypted as a whole before said transfer,

said transfer from said second electronic card (224) to said first electronic card (124) of said compacted data version generated in said second computer system (200) or in said second electronic card (124) being made simultaneously with a retransmission from said second electronic card (224) to said first electronic card (124) of said compacted data version received by said second electronic card (224), said transfer and retransmission of said compacted data versions also being made simultaneously with a retransmission from said second electronic card (224) to said first electronic card (124) of said data received by said second electronic card (224), said data to be retransmitted and both compacted data versions being combined and encrypted as a whole before said transfer.

20. A method according to any of the claims 6, 7, 9, 10 or 19, characterized in that the compacted data is generated by use of a common compression key (Ck) prestored in the electronic cards (124, 224).

21. A method according to claim 1 or 2, characterized in that

encryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first electronic card (124) include(s) a first encryption key made by use of a first signature key (SkA) stored in the first electronic card (124),

decryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the second electronic card (224) include(s) a second decryption key made by use of a second verification key (VkB) stored in the second electronic card (224) and a publicly known identification (IdA) of the first electronic card (124),

encryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the second electronic card (224) include(s) a second encryption key made by use of a second signature key (SkB) stored in the second electronic card (224),

decryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first electronic card (124) include(s) a first decryption key made by use of a first verification key (VkA) stored in the first electronic card (124) and

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a publicly known identification (IdB) of the second electronic card (224), and

the authenticity verification comprises the steps of:

a) generating a first random number (R1) in the transmitter,

b) encrypting the first random (R1) number by use of the first encryption key to obtain a first authenticity message within the first electronic card (124),

c) transmitting the first authenticity message to the second electronic card (224),

d) decrypting the first authenticity message within the second electronic card (224) by use of the second decryption key to obtain the first random number (R1) within the second electronic card (224),

e) generating a second random number (R2) in the receiver,

f) combining the received first random number (R1) with the second random number (R2) to obtain a first combination (R1, R2) within the second electronic card (224),

g) encrypting the first combination (R1, R2) by use of the second encryption key to obtain a second authenticity message within the second electronic card (224),

h) transmitting the second authenticity message to the first electronic card (124),

l) decrypting the second authenticity message within the first electronic card (124) by use of the first decryption key to obtain the first combination (R1, R2) within the first electronic card (R1, R2),

j) separating the received first combination (R1, R2) within the first electronic card (124),

k) comparing the value of the first random number (R1) generated in the transmitter with the value of the first random number (R1) received from the second electronic card (224) and stored in the first electronic card (124), and in case the two values are equal verifying the authenticity of the identity of the second electronic card (224),

l) generating a third random number (R3) within the transmitter,

m) combining the received second random number (R2) with the third random number (R3) to obtain a second combination (R2, R3) within the first electronic card (124),

n) encrypting the second combination (R2, R3) by use of the first encryption key to obtain a third authenticity message within the first electronic card (124),

o) transmitting the third authenticity message to the second electronic card (224),

p) decrypting the third authenticity message within the second electronic card (224) by use of the second decryption key to obtain the second combination (R2, R3) within the second electronic card (224),

q) separating the received second combination (R2, R3) within the second electronic card (224),

r) comparing the value of the second random number (R2) generated in the receiver with the value of the second random number (R2) received from the first electronic card (124) and stored in the second electronic card (224), and in case the two values are equal verifying the authenticity of the identity of the first electronic card (124).

22. A method according to claim 1, characterized in that

encryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first electronic card include(s) a first encryption key made by use of a first signature key (SkA) stored in the first electronic card (124),

decryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the second electronic card (224) include(s) a second decryption key made by use of a second verification key (VkB) stored in the second electronic card (224) and a publicly known identification (IdA) of the first electronic card (124),

encryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the second electronic card (224) include(s) a second encryption key made by use of a second signature key (SkB) stored in the second electronic card (224),

decryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first electronic card (124) include(s) a first decryption key made by use of a first verification key (VkA) stored in the first electronic card (124) and a publicly known identification (IdB) of the second electronic card (224),

a common compression key (Ck) is stored in the internal storage of the first electronic card (124) and in the internal storage of the second electronic card (224),

encryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first electronic card (124) and in the internal storage of the second electronic card (224) include(s) a random encryption key made by use of a previously exchanged random number (R1),

decryption key(s) stored in the internal storage of the first electronic card (124) and in the internal storage of the second electronic card (224) include(s) a random decryption key made by use of a previously exchanged random number (R1), and

the integrity verification comprises the steps of:

a) generating a first compacted document (MacA) of the data within the transmitter by use of the common compression key (Ck),

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b) encrypting the first compacted document (MacA) by use of the first encryption key to obtain an encrypted first compacted document (EmacA) within the first electronic card (124),
c) combining the data and the encrypted first compacted document (EmacA) to a first combination and encrypting this first combination by use of the random encryption key to obtain a first integrity message within the first electronic card (124),
d) transmitting the first integrity message to the second electronic card (224),
e) decrypting the first integrity message within the second electronic card (224) by use of the random decryption key to obtain the first combination within the second electronic card (224),
f) separating the first combination within the second electronic card (224),
g) generating within the receiver a second version of the first compacted document (MacA) of the received data by use of the common compression key (Ck),
h) decrypting the received encrypted first compacted document (EmacA) within the second electronic card (224) by use of the second decryption key to obtain a first version of the first compacted document (MacA),
i) comparing the obtained results of the first and second versions of the first compacted document (MacA), and in case the two versions are equal verifying within the receiver the integrity of the transmission of the data from the first electronic card (124) to the second electronic card (224),
j) generating within the receiver a second compacted document (MacB) of the first combination by use of the common compression key (Ck),
k) encrypting the second compacted document (MacB) by use of the second encryption key to obtain an encrypted second compacted document (EmacB) within the second electronic card (224),
l) combining the first combination and the encrypted second compacted document (EmacB) to a second combination and encrypting this second combination by use of the random encryption key to obtain a second integrity message within the second electronic card (224),
m) transmitting the second integrity message to the first electronic card (124),
n) decrypting the second integrity message within the first electronic card (124) by use of the random decryption key to obtain the second combination within the first electronic card (124),
o) separating the second combination within the first electronic card (124),
p) generating within the transmitter a second version of the second compacted document (MacB) of the received first combination by use of the common compression key (Ck),
q) decrypting the received encrypted second compacted document (EmacB) within the first electronic card (124) by use of the first decryption key to obtain a first version of the second compacted document (MacB),
r) comparing the obtained results of the first and second versions of the second compacted document (MacB), and in case the two versions are equal verifying within the transmitter the integrity of the transmission of the data from the first electronic card (124) to the second electronic card (224).

23. A method according to claim 22, characterized in that the previously exchanged random number (R1) has been exchanged in an authenticity verification as described in claim 21.

24. A system for transfer of data from a first computer system (100) to a second computer system (200), which second computer system (200) is autonomous in relation to said first computer system (100), via a data transmission line (128, 228), according to the method of any of the claims 1-11, said system comprising a first station (122) and a second station (222), which are connected to and communicate with said first and said second computer system (100, 200), respectively, and which furthermore via said first and said second computer system (100, 200), respectively, and corresponding interfacing means are connected to said data transmission line (128, 228), as well as a first and a second electronic card (124 224), characterized in that

said first and second electronic card (124, 224) being temporarily connected to or being detachable from the first and the second station (122, 222), respectively,

said first and second electronic card (124, 224) each comprise a central data processing unit, an input/output gate for communication with said corresponding station (122, 222), an encryption/decryption means as well as an internal storage and together constitute a coherent set of electronic cards (124, 224) comprising coherent secret key(s) previously stored in the internal storage of the electronic cards (124, 224), said secret keys being used as encryption/decryption keys or being used for generating coherent encryption/decryption keys, said encryption/decryption keys being input into the internal storage of said electronic cards (124, 224), and said secret key(s) and said coherent encryption/decryption keys generated by use of the secret key(s) only being handled within the electronic cards (124, 224).

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25. A system according to claim 24, said first and said second electronic card (124, 224) being of the type DES Smart Card from the firm Philips, Super Smart Card from the firm Bull or CP8 Smart Card from the firm Bull.

Patentansprüche

1. Ein Verfahren zur Übertragung von Daten von einem ersten Computersystem (100) auf ein zweites Computersystem (200) über eine Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228), in welchem für die Übertragung eine erste Station (122) zur Ausgabe von Daten von einer ersten elektronischen Karte (124) verwendet wird, wobei die erste Station (122) mit dem ersten Computersystem (100) verbunden ist und damit kommuniziert und außerdem über das erste Computersystem (100) und eine Interfaceeinrichtung mit der Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228) verbunden ist,
eine zweite Station (222) zur Ausgabe von Daten von einer zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) verwendet wird, wobei die zweite Station (222) mit dem zweiten Computersystem (200) verbunden ist und damit kommuniziert und außerdem über dieses zweite Computersystem (200) und eine Interfaceeinrichtung mit der Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228) verbunden ist,
wobei die Daten in verschlüsselter Form über die erste Station (122) auf das erste Computersystem (100) übertragen werden und davon über eine Interfaceeinrichtung des ersten Computersystems (100) auf die Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228) übertragen werden, und
wobei die Daten durch das zweite Computersystem (200) in verschlüsselter Form über die Interfaceeinrichtung des zweiten Computersystems (200) empfangen werden,
dadurch gekennzeichnet, daß
die erste und zweite elektronische Karte (124, 224) zeitweise verbunden sind mit der ersten bzw. der zweiten Station (122, 222) oder davon trennbar sind,
die erste und zweite elektronische Karte (124, 224) jeweils eine zentrale Datenverarbeitungseinheit, einen Eingabe-/Ausgangsanschluß zur Kommunikation mit der entsprechenden Station (122, 222), sowohl eine Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung als auch einen internen Speicher aufweisen und zusammen einen kohärenten Satz elektronischer Karten (124, 224) darstellen, der einen vorher in den internen Speicher der elektronischen Karten (124, 224) abgespeicherten geheimen Schlüssel (abgespeicherte geheime Schlüssel) umfaßt, wobei der geheime Schlüssel (die geheimen Schlüssel) als Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungsschlüssel verwendet wird (werden) oder zur Erzeugung kohärenter Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungsschlüssel verwendet wird (werden), wobei die Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungsschlüssel in den internen Speicher der elektronischen Karten (124, 224) eingegeben werden und der geheime Schlüssel (die geheimen Schlüssel) und die kohärenten unter Verwendung des geheimen Schlüssels (der geheimen Schlüssel) erzeugten Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungsschlüssel nur innerhalb der elektronischen Karten (124, 224) verarbeitet werden,
die Daten von dem ersten Computersystem (100) über die erste Station (122) und den Eingabe-/Ausgangsanschluß der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) übertragen werden, in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und darin temporär gespeichert werden,
die Daten von dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) ausgegeben werden und in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) und dem (den) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel (Verschlüsselungsschlüsseln) verschlüsselt werden und die Daten von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) in verschlüsselter Form über den Eingabe-/Ausgangsanschluß der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) vor der Übertragung der verschlüsselten Daten von dem ersten Computersystem (100) auf das zweite Computersystem (200) ausgegeben werden,
die übertragenen, verschlüsselten Daten von dem zweiten Computersystem (200) über die zweite Station (222) und über den Eingabe-/Ausgangsanschluß der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die zweite elektronische Karte (224) übertragen und in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin temporär gespeichert werden,
die Daten von dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) in verschlüsselter Form ausgegeben werden und in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) und dem (den) in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel (Entschlüsselungsschlüsseln) in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) entschlüsselt werden,
die Daten nach der Entschlüsselung in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) von der zweiten elektro-

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nischen Karte (224) ausgegeben werden und zu dem zweiten Computersystem (200) über den Eingabe-/Ausgangsanschluß der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) und über die zweite Station (222) an das zweite Computersystem (200) ausgegeben werden,
die Daten von dem ersten Computersystem (100) auf das zweite Computersystem (200) übertragen werden ohne irgendwelche geheimen Schlüssel zwischen den Computersystemen (100, 200) auszutauschen, und
die Datenübertragung eine Authentizitäts-/Integritätsverifikation umfaßt.

2. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Verifikation der Authentizität der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) in bezug auf die zweite elektronische Karte (224) und umgekehrt vor der Übertragung der Daten von dem ersten Computersystem (100) auf das zweite Computersystem (200) durchgeführt wird.

3. Ein Verfahren nach einem der vorangegangenen Ansprüche, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Eingabe in, die Ausgabe aus, die Verschlüsselung und die Entschlüsselung und möglicherweise die Authentizitäts- und Integritätsverifikation autonom durch die zentrale Datenverarbeitungseinheit der individuellen Karten (124, 224) gesteuert wird.

4. Ein Verfahren nach einem der vorangegangenen Ansprüche, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Übertragung der Daten gemäß dem LECAM-Protokoll durchgeführt wird.

5. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 2, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Authentizitätsverifikation durchgeführt wird durch
einen ersten in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) erzeugten Datensatz (R1), wobei der Datensatz (R1) in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und darin gespeichert wird und in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) und des (der) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssels (Verschlüsselungsschlüssel) verschlüsselt wird,
der erste Datensatz (R1) von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) in verschlüsselter Form über den Eingangs-/Ausgangsanschluß der ersten elektronischen Karte ausgegeben wird, über die erste Station (122) auf das erste Computersystem (100) übertragen wird und davon über die Interfaceeinrichtung des ersten Computersystems (100) auf die Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228) übertragen wird,
der erste Datensatz (R1) von dem zweiten Computersystem (200) in verschlüsselter Form über die Interfaceeinrichtung des zweiten Computersystems (200) empfangen wird, über die zweite Station (222) und über den Eingangs-/Ausgangsanschluß der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die zweite elektronische Karte (224) übertragen wird, in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin temporär abgespeichert wird,
der erste von dem zweiten Computersystem (200) in verschlüsselter Form empfangene Datensatz (R1) von dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) ausgegeben wird und in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) und des (der) in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) abgespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssels (Entschlüsselungsschlüssel) entschlüsselt wird,
der erste von dem zweiten Computersystem (200) in verschlüsselter Form empfangene und in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) entschlüsselte Datensatz (R1) in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin abgespeichert wird,
ein zweiter Datensatz (R2) in der zweiten elektronischen karte (224) erzeugt wird, wobei der zweite Datensatz (R2) in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin abgespeichert wird,
eine erste Kombination (R1, R2) aus dem ersten von dem zweiten Computersystem (200) in verschlüsselter Form empfangenen, entschlüsselten und in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) abgespeicherten Datensatz (R1) und aus dem zweiten in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Datensatz (R2) in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) erzeugt wird, wobei die erste Kombination (R1, R2) in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin gespeichert wird,
die erste Kombination (R1, R2) in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) und des (der) in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssels (Verschlüsselungsschlüssel) verschlüsselt wird,

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die erste Kombination (R1, R2) von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) in verschlüsselter Form über den Eingangs-/Ausgangsanschluß der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) ausgegeben wird, über die zweite Station (222) auf das zweite Computersystem (200) übertragen wird und davon über die Interfaceeinrichtung des zweiten Computersystems (200) auf die Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228) übertragen wird,

die erste Kombination (R1, R2) durch das erste Computersystem (100) in verschlüsselter Form über die Interfaceeinrichtung des ersten Computersystems (100) empfangenen wird, auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) über die erste Station (122) und über den Eingangs-/Ausgangsanschluß der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) übertragen wird, in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und temporär darin abgespeichert wird,

die erste von dem ersten Computersystem (100) in verschlüsselter Form empfangene Kombination (R1, R2) von dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) ausgegeben wird und in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) mittels der Entschlüsselungs-/Verschlüsselungseinrichtung der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) und des (der) in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssels (Entschlüsselungsschlüssel) entschlüsselt wird,

die erste von dem ersten Computersystem (100) in verschlüsselter Form empfangene und in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) entschlüsselte Kombination (R1, R2) in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und darin gespeichert wird,

die erste in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherte Kombination (R1, R2) zur Erzeugung eines ersten zur ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zurückübertragenen Datensatzes (R1) und eines zweiten zur ersten elektronischen Karte (124) übertragenen Datensatzes (R2) dekombiniert wird,

der erste zur ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zurückübertragene Datensatz (R1) und der zweite zur ersten elektronischen Karte (124) übertragene Datensatz (R2) in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und darin abgespeichert wird,

der erste in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherte Datensatz (R1) mit dem ersten in die erste elektronische Karte (124) zurückübertragenen und in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Datensatz (R1) zur Verifikation der Identität zwischen diesen beiden Datensätzen zur Verifikation der Authentizität der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) in bezug auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) verglichen wird,

ein dritter Datensatz (R3) in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) erzeugt wird, wobei der dritte Datensatz (R3) in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und darin gespeichert wird,

eine zweite Kombination (R2, R3) aus dem zweiten in verschlüsselter Form durch das erste Computersystem (100) empfangenen, entschlüsselten und in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Datensatz (R2) und aus dem dritten in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Datensatz (R3) in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) erzeugt wird, wobei die zweite Kombination (R2, R3) in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und darin gespeichert wird,

die zweite Kombination (R2, R3) in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) und des (der) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssels (Verschlüsselungsschlüssel) verschlüsselt wird,

die zweite Kombination (R2, R3) von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) in verschlüsselter Form über den Eingangs-/Ausgangsanschluß der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) ausgegeben wird, über die erste Station (122) auf das erste Computersystem (100) übertragen wird und davon über die Interfaceeinrichtung des ersten Computersystems (100) auf die Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228) übertragen wird,

die zweite Kombination (R2, R3) durch das zweite Computersystem (200) in verschlüsselter Form über die Interfaceeinrichtung des zweiten Computersystems (200) empfangen wird, über die zweite Station (222) und über den Eingangs-/Ausgangsanschluß der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die zweite elektronische Karte (224) übertragen wird, in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin temporär abgespeichert wird,

die zweite durch das zweite Computersystem (200) in verschlüsselter Form empfangene Kombination (R2, R3) von dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) ausgegeben wird und in der zweiten elektronischen Karte mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) und des (der) in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssels (Entschlüsselungsschlüssel) entschlüsselt wird,

die zweite durch das zweite Computersystem (200) in verschlüsselter Form empfangene und entschlüs-

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seite Kombination (R2, R3) in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin abgespeichert wird,
die zweite in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherte Kombination (R2, R3) zur Erzeugung eines zweiten zur zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zurückübertragenen Datensatzes (R2) und eines dritten zur zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) übertragenen Datensatzes (R3) dekombiniert wird,
der zweite zur zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zurückübertragene Datensatz (R2) und der dritte zur zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) übertragene Datensatz (R3) in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin abgespeichert werden, und
der zweite in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherte Datensatz (R2) mit dem zweiten zur zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zurückübertagenen und in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Datensatz (R2) zur Verifikation der Identität zwischen diesen Datensätzen zur Verifikation der Authentizität der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) in bezug auf die zweite elektronische Karte (224) verglichen wird.

6. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Integritätsverifikation dadurch ausgeführt wird, daß
eine kompakte Version der Daten in dem ersten Computersystem (100) oder in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) erzeugt wird, wobei die kompakte Version in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und darin gespeichert wird,
eine kompakte Version der auf das zweite Computersystem (200) übertragenen Daten in dem zweiten Computersystem (200) oder in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) erzeugt wird, wobei die kompakte Version in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin gespeichert wird,
die in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherte kompakte Datenversion aus dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) ausgegeben wird und in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) und des (der) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssels (Verschlüsselungsschlüssel) verschlüsselt wird,
die durch die Verschlüsselungs/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) verschlüsselte kompakte Datenversion von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) über den Eingangs-/Ausgangsanschluß der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) ausgegeben wird, über die erste Station (122) auf das erste Computersystem (100) übertragen wird und davon über die Interfaceeinrichtung des ersten Computersystems (100) auf die Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228) übertragen wird,
die von dem ersten Computersystem (100) übertragene, verschlüsselte und kompakte Datenversion durch das zweite Computersystem (200) über die Interfaceeinrichtung des zweiten Computersystems (200) empfangen wird, auf die zweite elektronische Karte (224) über die zweite Station (222) und über den Eingangs-/Ausgangsanschluß der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) übertragen wird, in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin temporär gespeichert wird,
die in verschlüsselter Form durch das zweite Computersystem (200) empfangene kompakte Datenversion von dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) ausgegeben wird und in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) und des (der) in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) abgespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssels (Entschlüsselungsschlüssel) entschlüsselt wird,
die entschlüsselte, durch das zweite Computersystem (200) in verschlüsselter Form empfangene und durch die zweite elektronische Karte (224) entschlüsselte kompakte Datenversion in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin abgespeichert wird,
ein Vergleich der in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten kompakten Datenversion mit der in verschlüsselter Form durch das zweite Computersystem (200) empfangenen und entschlüsselten kompakten Datenversion in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zur Verifikation der Integrität von oder der Identität zwischen den von dem ersten Computersystem (100) übertragenen und den von dem zweiten Computersystem (200) empfangenen Daten durchgeführt wird.

7. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Integritätsverifikation dadurch ausgeführt wird, daß
eine kompakte Version der Daten in dem ersten Computersystem (100) oder in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) erzeugt wird, wobei die kompakte Version in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und darin gespeichert wird,

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eine kompakte Version der auf das zweite Computersystem (200) übertragenen Daten in dem zweiten Computersystem (200) oder in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) erzeugt wird, wobei die kompakte Version in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) eingegeben und darin gespeichert wird,

die in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherte kompakte Datenversion aus dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) ausgegeben wird und in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) und des (der) in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssels (Verschlüsselungsschlüssel) verschlüsselt wird,

die durch die Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) verschlüsselte kompakte Datenversion von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) über den Eingangs-/Ausgangsanschluß der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) ausgegeben wird, über die zweite Station (222) auf das zweite Computersystem (200) übertragen wird und davon über die Interfaceeinrichtung des zweiten Computersystems (200) auf die Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228) übertragen wird,

die von dem zweiten Computersystem (200) übertragene, verschlüsselte und kompakte Datenversion durch das erste Computersystem (100) über die Interfaceeinrichtung des ersten Computersystems (100) empfangen wird, auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) über die erste Station (122) und über den Eingangs-/Ausgangsanschluß der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) übertragen wird, in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und darin temporär gespeichert wird,

die in verschlüsselter Form durch das erste Computersystem (100) empfangene kompakte Datenversion von dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) ausgegeben wird und in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) mittels der Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) und des (der) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) abgespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssels (Entschlüsselungsschlüssel) entschlüsselt wird,

die entschlüsselte, durch das erste Computersystem (100) in verschlüsselter Form empfangene und durch die erste elektronische Karte (124) entschlüsselte kompakte Datenversion in den internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) eingegeben und darin abgespeichert wird,

ein Vergleich in der in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten kompakten Datenversion mit der in verschlüsselter Form durch das erste Computersystem (100) empfangenen und entschlüsselten kompakten Datenversion in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zur Verifikation der Integrität des oder der Identität zwischen den von dem ersten Computersystem (100) übertragenen und den von dem zweiten Computersystem (200) empfangenen Daten durchgeführt wird.

8. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 6 und 7, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß eine Übertragung einer kompakten Datenversion sowohl von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) auf die zweite elektronische Karte (224) als auch von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) und ein Vergleich beider übertragener kompakter Datenversionen mit den gespeicherten kompakten Datenversionen in den zwei elektronischen Karten (124, 224) zur Integritätsverifikation durchgeführt wird.

9. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 6 oder 8, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Übertragung der in dem ersten Computersystem (100) oder in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) erzeugten kompakten Datenversion von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) auf die zweite elektronische Karte (224) gleichzeitig mit der Übertragung der Daten selbst durchgeführt wird, wobei die Daten und die kompakte Datenversion vor der Übertragung kombiniert und als Ganzes verschlüsselt werden.

10. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 7 oder 8, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Übertragung der in dem zweiten Computersystem (200) oder in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) erzeugten kompakten Datenversion von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) gleichzeitig mit einer Rückübertragung der von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) empfangenen Daten von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) durchgeführt wird, wobei die rückzuübertragenden Daten und die kompakte Datenversion vor der Übertragung kombiniert und als Ganzes verschlüsselt werden.

11. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 8, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Übertragung von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) der in dem zweiten Computersystem (200) oder in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) erzeugten, kompakten Datenversion gleichzeitig mit einer Rückübertragung der durch die zweite elektronische Karte (224) empfangenen, kompakten Datenversion von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) durchgeführt wird, wo-

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bei die Übertragung und die Rückübertragung der kompakten Datenversionen ebenfalls gleichzeitig mit einer Rückübertragung der durch die zweite elektronische Karte (224) empfangenen Daten von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) durchgeführt wird, wobei die rückzuübertragenden Daten und die beiden kompakten Datenversionen vor der Übertragung kombiniert und als Ganzes verschlüsselt werden.

12. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 5, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß der zur Verschlüsselung des ersten Datensatzes (R1) und der zweiten Kombination (R2, R3) verwendete Verschlüsselungsschlüssel unter Verwendung eines ersten in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Signaturschlüssels (SkA) erstellt wird,
der zum Entschlüsseln der verschlüsselten Form des ersten Datensatzes (R1) und der verschlüsselten Form der zweiten Kombination (R2, R3) verwendete Entschlüsselungsschlüssel unter Verwendung eines zweiten in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Verifikationsschlüssels (VkB) und einer allgemein bekannten Identifikation (IdA) der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) erstellt wird,
der zum Verschlüsseln der ersten Kombination (R1, R2) verwendete Verschlüsselungsschlüssel unter Verwendung eines in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Signaturschlüssels (SkB) erstellt wird, und
der zur Entschlüsselung der verschlüsselten Form der ersten Kombination (R1, R2) verwendete Entschlüsselungsschlüssel unter Verwendung eines ersten in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Verifikationsschlüssels (VkA) und einer allgemein bekannten Identifikation (IdB) der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) erstellt wird.

13. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die zur Verschlüsselung und Entschlüsselung der übertragenen Daten verwendeten Verschlüsselungs- und Entschlüsselungsschlüssel unter Verwendung eines ersten in einer Authentizitätsverifikation, die vor der Übertragung der Daten gemäß Anspruch 5 durchgeführt wird, erzeugten Datensatzes (R1) erstellt wird.

14. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 9, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die kompakte Datenversion unter Verwendung eines ersten Signaturschlüssels (SkA), der in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeichert ist, verschlüsselt wird, bevor sie mit den Daten kombiniert wird und als Ganzes weiter verschlüsselt wird, und
die verschlüsselte, kompakte Datenversion unter Verwendung eines zweiten in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Verifikationsschlüssels (VkB) und einer allgemein bekannten Identifikation (IdA) der ersten elektronischen Karte (124), nachdem die Kombination der Daten und die kompakte Datenversion übertragen worden und als Ganzes entschlüsselt worden sind, entschlüsselt wird.

15. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 9, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die zur Verschlüsselung und Entschlüsselung der Kombination der Daten und der kompakten Datenversion verwendeten Verschlüsselungs- und Entschlüsselungsschlüssel unter Verwendung eines ersten in einer Authentitätsverifikation, die vor der Übertragung der Daten gemäß Anspruch 5 durchgeführt wird, erzeugten Datensatzes (R1) erstellt wird.

16. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 10, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die kompakte Datenversion unter Verwendung eines zweiten Signaturschlüssels (SkB), der in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeichert ist, verschlüsselt wird, bevor sie mit den rückzuübertragenden Daten kombiniert wird und als Ganzes weiter verschlüsselt wird, und
die verschlüsselte, kompakte Datenversion unter Verwendung eines ersten in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Verifikationsschlüssels (VkA) und einer allgemein bekannten Identifikation (IdB) der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224), nachdem die Kombination der rückzuübertragenden Daten und die kompakte Datenversion übertragen worden und als Ganzes entschlüsselt worden sind, entschlüsselt wird.

17. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 10, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die zur Verschlüsselung und Entschlüsselung der Kombination der rückzuübertragenen Daten und der kompaktem Datenversion verwendeten Verschlüsselungs- und Entschlüsselungsschlüssel unter Verwendung eines ersten in einer Authentizitätsverifikation, die vor der Übertragung der Daten gemäß Anspruch 5 durchgeführt wird, erzeugten Datensatzes (R1) erstellt wird.

18. Ein Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 13, 15 oder 17, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Authentizi-

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tätsverifikation weiter das Verfahren nach Anspruch 12 umfaßt.

19. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 8, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die Übertragung der in dem ersten Computersystem (100) oder in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) erzeugten kompakten Datenversion von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) auf die zweite elektronische Karte (224) gleichzeitig mit der Übertragung der Daten selbst durchgeführt wird, wobei die Daten und die kompakte Datenversion vor der Übertragung kombiniert und als Ganzes verschlüsselt werden,
die Übertragung von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) der in dem zweiten Computersystem (200) oder in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) erzeugten kompakten Datenversion gleichzeitig mit einer Rückübertragung der durch die zweite elektronische Karte (224) empfangenen kompakten Datenversion von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) durchgeführt wird, wobei die Übertragung und die Rückübertragung der kompakten Datenversionen ebenfalls gleichzeitig mit einer Rückübertragung der durch die zweite elektronische Karte (224) empfangenen Daten von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) auf die erste elektronische Karte (124) durchgeführt wird, wobei die rückzuübertragenden Daten und die beiden kompakten Datenversionen vor der Übertragung kombiniert und als Ganzes verschlüsselt werden.

20. Ein Verfahren nach einem der Ansprüche 6, 7, 9, 10 oder 19, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die kompakten Daten durch Verwendung eines gemeinsamen in den elektronischen Karten (124, 224) vorgespeicherten Kompressionsschlüssels (Ck) erzeugt werden.

21. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 1 oder 2, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß
der (die) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherte Verschlüsselungsschlüssel (gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel) einen ersten unter Verwendung eines ersten in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Signaturschlüssels (SkA) erstellten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel umfaßt (umfassen),
der (die) in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherte Entschlüsselungsschlüssel (gespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel) einen zweiten unter Verwendung eines in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Verifikationsschlüssels (VkB) und einer allgemein bekannten Identifikation der ersten elektronischen Karte (IdA) erstellten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel umfaßt (umfassen),
der (die) in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherte Verschlüsselungsschlüssel (gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel) einen zweiten unter Verwendung eines zweiten in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Signaturschlüssels (SkB) erstellten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel umfaßt (umfassen),
der (die) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherte Entschlüsselungsschlüssel (gespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel) einen ersten unter Verwendung eines ersten in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Verifikationsschlüssels (VkA) und einer allgemein bekannten Identifikation (IdB) der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) erstellten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel umfaßt (umfassen), und
die Authentizitätsverifikation die Schritte umfaßt:
a) Erzeugen einer ersten Zufallszahl (R1) in dem Transmitter,
b) Verschlüsseln der ersten Zufallszahl (R1) unter Verwendung des ersten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel, um eine erste Authentizitätsnachricht in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zu erhalten,
c) Übertragen der ersten Authentizitätsnachricht zur zweiten elektronischen Karte (224),
d) Entschlüsseln der ersten Authentizitätsnachricht in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) unter Verwendung des zweiten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel, um die erste Zufallszahl (R1) in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zu erhalten,
e) Erzeugen einer zweiten Zufallszahl (R2) in dem Empfänger,
f) Kombinieren der empfangenen ersten Zufallszahl (R1) mit der zweiten Zufallszahl (R2), um eine erste Kombination (R1, R2) in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zu erhalten,
g) Verschlüsseln der ersten Kombination (R1, R2) unter Verwendung des zweiten Verschlüsselungsschlüssels, um eine zweite Authentizitätsnachricht in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zu erhalten,
h) Übertragen der zweiten Authentizitätsnachricht zur ersten elektronischen Karte (124),
i) Entschlüsseln der zweiten Authentizitätsnachricht in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) unter Verwendung des ersten Entschlüsselungsschlüssels, um die erste Kombination (R1, R2) in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zu erhalten,

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j) Trennen der empfangenen ersten Kombination (R1, R2) in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124),
k) Vergleichen des Werts der ersten in dem Transmitter erzeugen Zufallszahl (R1) mit dem Wert der ersten von der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) empfangenen und in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Zufallszahl (R1), und in dem Fall, in dem die zwei Werte gleich sind, Verifizieren der Authentizität der Identität der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224),
l) Erzeugen einer dritten Zufallszahl (R3) in dem Transmitter,
m) Kombinieren der empfangenen zweiten Zufallszahl (R2) mit der dritten Zufallszahl (R3), um eine zweite Kombination (R2, R3) in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zu erhalten,
n) Verschlüsseln der zweiten Kombination (R2, R3) unter Verwendung des ersten Verschlüsselungsschlüssels, um eine dritte Authentizitätsnachricht in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zu erhalten,
o) Übertragen der dritten Authentizitätsnachricht zur zweiten elektronischen Karte (224),
p) Entschlüsseln der dritten Authentizitätsnachricht in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) unter Verwendung des zweiten Entschlüsselungsschlüssels, um die zweite Kombination (R2, R3) in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zu erhalten,
q) Trennen der empfangenen zweiten Kombination (R2, R3) in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224),
r) Vergleichen der Werte der zweiten in dem Empfänger erzeugen Zufallszahl (R2) mit dem Wert der zweiten von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) empfangenen und in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Zufallszahl (R2), und in dem Fall, in dem die zwei Werte gleich sind, Verifizieren der Authentizität der Identität der ersten elektronischen Karte (124).

22. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 1, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß
der (die) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherte Verschlüsselungsschlüssel (gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel) einen ersten durch Verwendung eines ersten in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Signaturschlüssels (SkA) erstellten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel umfaßt (umfassen),
der (die) in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherte Entschlüsselungsschlüssel (gespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel) einen zweiten unter Verwendung eines zweiten in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Verifikationsschlüssels (VkB) und einer allgemein bekannten Identifikation (IdA) der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) erstellten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel umfaßt (umfassen),
der (die) in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherte Verschlüsselungsschlüssel (gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel) einen zweiten unter Verwendung eines zweiten in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherten Signaturschlüssels (SkB) erstellten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel umfaßt (umfassen),
der (die) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherte Entschlüsselungsschlüssel (gespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel) einen ersten unter Verwendung eines ersten in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) gespeicherten Verifikationsschlüssels (VkA) und einer allgemein bekannten Identifikation (IdB) der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) erstellten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel umfaßt (umfassen),
ein gemeinsamer Kompressionsschlüssel (Ck) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) und in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeichert ist,
der (die) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) und in dem internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherte Verschlüsselungsschlüssel (gespeicherten Verschlüsselungsschlüssel) einen unter Verwendung einer vorher ausgetauschten Zufallszahl (R1) erstellten Zufallsverschlüsselungsschlüssel umfaßt (umfassen),
der (die) in dem internen Speicher der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) und in den internen Speicher der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) gespeicherte Entschlüsselungsschlüssel (gespeicherten Entschlüsselungsschlüssel) einen unter Verwendung einer vorher ausgetauschten Zufallszahl (R1) erstellten Zufallsentschlüsselungsschlüssel umfaßt (umfassen), und
die Integritätsverifikation die Schritte aufweist:
a) Erzeugen eines ersten kompakten Dokument (MacA) der Daten in dem Transmitter unter Verwendung des gemeinsamen Kompressionsschlüssels (Ck),
b) Verschlüsseln des ersten kompakten Dokuments (MacA) unter Verwendung des ersten Verschlüsselungs-Schlüssels, um ein verschlüsseltes erstes kompaktes Dokument (EmacA) in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zu erhalten,
c) Kombinieren der Daten und des verschlüsselten ersten kompakten Dokuments (EmacA) zu einer ersten Kombination und Verschlüsseln dieser ersten Kombination unter Verwendung des Zufallsverschlüsselungsschlüssels, um eine erste Integritätsnachricht in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124)

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zu erhalten,
d) Übertragen der ersten Integritätsnachricht zur zweiten elektronischen Karte (224),
e) Entschlüsseln der ersten Integritätsnachricht in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) unter Verwendung des Zufallsentschlüsselungsschlüssels, um die erste Kombination in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zu erhalten,
f) Trennen der ersten Kombination in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224),
g) Erzeugen einer zweiten Version des ersten kompakten Dokuments (MacA) der empfangenen Daten unter Verwendung des gemeinsamen Kompressionsschlüssels (Ck) in dem Empfänger,
h) Entschlüsseln des empfangenen, verschlüsselten ersten kompakten Dokuments (EmacA) in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) unter Verwendung des zweiten Entschlüsselungsschlüssels, um eine erste Version des ersten kompakten Dokuments (MacA) zu erhalten,
i) Vergleichen der erhaltenen Resultate der ersten und der zweiten Versionen des ersten kompakten Dokuments (MacA), und in dem Fall, in dem die zwei Versionen in dem Empfänger gleich sind, Verifizieren der Integrität der Übertragung der Daten von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zur zweiten elektronischen Karte (224),
j) Erzeugen eines zweiten kompakten Dokuments (MacB) der ersten Kombination unter Verwendung des gemeinsamen Kompressionsschlüssels (Ck) in dem Empfänger,
k) Verschlüsseln des zweiten kompakten Dokuments (MacB) unter Verwendung des zweiten Verschlüsselungsschlüssels, um ein verschlüsseltes zweites kompaktes Dokument (EmacB) in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zu erhalten,
l) Kombinieren der ersten Kombination und des verschlüsselten, zweiten kompakten Dokuments (EmacB) zu einer zweiten Kombination und Verschlüsseln dieser zweiten Kombination unter Verwendung des Zufallsverschlüsselungsschlüssels, um eine zweite Integritätsnachricht in der zweiten elektronischen Karte (224) zu erhalten,
m) Übertragen der zweiten Integritätsnachricht zur ersten elektronischen Karte (124),
n) Entschlüsseln der zweiten Integritätsnachricht in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) unter Verwendung des Zufallsentschlüsselungsschlüssels, um die zweite Kombination in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zu erhalten,
o) Trennen der zweiten Kombination in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124),
p) Erzeugen einer zweiten Version des zweiten kompakten Dokuments (MacB) der empfangenen ersten Kombination unter Verwendung des gemeinsamen Kompressionsschlüssels (Ck) in dem Transmitter,
q) Entschlüsseln des empfangenen zweiten kompakten Dokuments (EmacB) in der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) unter Verwendung des ersten Entschlüsselungs-Schlüssels, um eine erste Version des zweiten kompakten Dokuments (MacB) zu erhalten,
r) Vergleichen der erhaltenen Resultate der ersten und der zweiten Version des zweiten kompakten Dokuments (MacB), und in dem Fall, in dem die zwei Versionen in dem Transmitter gleich sind, Verifizieren der Integrität der Übertragung der Daten von der ersten elektronischen Karte (124) zur zweiten elektronischen Karte (224).

23. Ein Verfahren nach Anspruch 22, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß die vorher ausgetauschten Zufallszahlen (R1) in einer Authentizitätsverifikation nach Anspruch 21 ausgetauscht worden sind.

24. Ein System zur Übertragung von Daten über eine Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228) von einem ersten Computersystem (100) auf ein zweites Computersystem (200), das autonom in bezug auf das erste Computersystem (100) ist, nach dem Verfahren eines der Ansprüche 1-11, wobei das System sowohl eine erste Station (122) und eine zweite Station (222), die angeschlossen sind an und kommunizieren mit dem ersten bzw. zweiten Computersystem (100, 200) und die außerdem über das erste bzw- das zweite Computersystem (100, 200) und entsprechende Interfaceeinrichtungen an die Datenübertragungsleitung (128, 228) angeschlossen sind, als auch eine erste und eine zweite elektronische Karte (124, 224) aufweist, **dadurch gekennzeichnet**, daß
die erste und zweite elektronische Karte (124, 224) zeitweise verbunden sind mit der ersten bzw. der zweiten Station (122, 222) oder davon trennbar sind,
die erste und zweite elektronische Karte (124, 224) jeweils eine zentrale Datenverarbeitungseinheit, einen Eingabe-/Ausgangsanschluß zur Kommunikation mit der entsprechenden Station (122, 222), sowohl eine Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungseinrichtung als auch einen internen Speicher aufweisen und zusammen einen kohärenten Satz elektronischer Karten (124, 224) darstellen, der einen vorher in den internen Speicher der elektronischen Karten (124, 224) abgespeicherten geheimen Schlüssel (abgespei-

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cherte geheime Schlüssel) umfaßt, wobei die geheimen Schlüssel als Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungsschlüssel verwendet werden oder zur Erzeugung kohärenter Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungsschlüssel verwendet werden, wobei die Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungsschlüssel in den internen Speicher der elektronischen Karten (124, 224) eingegeben werden und der geheime Schlüssel (die geheimen Schlüssel) und die kohärenten unter Verwendung des geheimen Schlüssels (der geheimen Schlüssel) erzeugten Verschlüsselungs-/Entschlüsselungsschlüssel nur innerhalb der elektronischen Karten (124, 224) verarbeitet werden.

25. Ein System nach Anspruch 24, wobei die erste und die zweite elektronische Karte (124, 224) vom Typ einer DES Smart Card von dem Unternehmen Philips, einer Super Smart Card von dem Unternehmen Bull oder einer CP8 Smart Card von dem Unternehmen Bull sind.

Revendications

1. Un procédé de transfert de données d'un premier système d'ordinateur (100) à un deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) par l'intermédiaire d'une ligne de transmission (128, 228) de données, dans lequel, pour ledit transfert

une première station (122) est utilisée pour délivrer des données d'une première carte électronique (124), ladite première station (122) étant reliée audit premier système d'ordinateur (200) et communiquant avec lui, et étant en outre reliée à ladite ligne de transmission (128, 228) de données par l'intermédiaire dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100) et de moyens d'interface,

une deuxième station (222) est utilisée pour délivrer des données à partir d'une deuxième carte électronique (224), ladite deuxième station (222) étant reliée audit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) et communiquant avec lui et étant en outre reliée à ladite ligne de transmission (128, 228) de données par l'intermédiaire de ce deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) et de moyens d'interface,

lesdites données étant transférées par l'intermédiaire de ladite première station (122) sous forme chiffrée vers ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) et étant transférées de là par l'intermédiaire desdits moyens d'interface dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100) vers ladite ligne de transmission (128, 228) de données,

lesdites données étant reçues par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sous forme chiffrée par l'intermédiaire desdits moyens d'interface dudit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200),

caractérisé en ce que

ladite première et ladite deuxième cartes électroniques (124, 224) sont temporairement reliées à la première et à la deuxième stations (122, 222) respectivement, ou en sont détachables,

ladite première et ladite deuxième cartes électroniques (124, 224) comprennent chacune une unité centrale de traitement de données, une porte d'entrée/sortie pour communiquer avec ladite station correspondante (122, 222), un moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage ainsi qu'une mémoire interne et constituent ensemble un jeu cohérent de cartes électroniques (124, 224) comprenant une clé ou des clés secrètes cohérentes mémorisées précédemment dans ladite mémoire interne des cartes électroniques (124, 224), ladite ou lesdites clés secrètes étant utilisées comme clés de chiffrage/déchiffrage ou étant utilisées pour engendrer des clés cohérentes de chiffrage/déchiffrage, lesdites clés de chiffrage/déchiffrage étant introduites dans la mémoire interne desdites cartes électroniques (124, 224), et ladite clé ou lesdites clés cohérentes de chiffrage/déchiffrage engendrées en utilisant la clé ou les clés secrètes n'étant maniées qu'à l'intérieur des cartes électroniques (124, 224),

lesdites données sont transférées à ladite première carte électronique (124) à partir dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100) par l'intermédiaire de ladite première station (122) et de ladite porte d'entrée/sortie de ladite première carte électronique (124), sont introduites dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) et y sont mémorisées temporairement,

lesdites données sont délivrées à partir de ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) et sont chiffrées dans ladite première carte électronique (124) au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite première carte électronique (124) et de ladite clé ou desdites clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire intérieure de ladite première carte électronique (124), et lesdites données sont délivrées à partir de ladite première carte électronique (124) sous forme chiffrée par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte d'entrée/sortie de ladite première carte électronique (124) avant ledit transfert de données chiffrées à partir dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100) vers ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200),

lesdites données chiffrées transférées sont transférées du deuxième système d'ordinateur (200)

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vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) par l'intermédiaire de ladite deuxième station (222) et par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte d'entrée/sortie de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et sont introduites dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et y sont mémorisées temporairement,

lesdites données sont délivrées à partir de ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) sous forme chiffrée et sont déchiffrées dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et de ladite clé ou desdites clés de déchiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

lesdites données sont délivrées à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), après déchiffrage dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), et sont délivrées vers ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte entrée/sortie de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et par l'intermédiaire de ladite deuxième station (222),

lesdites données sont transférées du premier système d'ordinateur (100) au deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sans aucun échange de clés secrètes entre les systèmes d'ordinateurs (100, 200), et

ledit transfert de données comprenant une vérification d'authenticité/d'intégrité.

2. Un procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce qu'une vérification de l'authenticité de ladite première carte électronique (124) par rapport à ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et vice versa est effectuée avant ledit transfert desdites données à partir dudit première système d'ordinateur vers ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200).

3. Un procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que ladite entrée dans la carte, ladite sortie de la carte, ledit chiffrage et ledit déchiffrage et éventuellement ladite vérification d'authenticité et d'intégrité sont commandés de façon autonome par ladite unité centrale de traitement de données de ladite carte individuelle (124, 224).

4. Un procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications précédentes, caractérisé en ce que ledit transfert desdites données ou dudit document électronique est effectué selon le protocole LECAM.

5. Un procédé selon la revendication 1 ou 2, caractérisé en ce que ladite vérification d'authenticité est effectuée par les étapes consistant à

engendrer un premier jeu de données (R1) dans ladite première carte électronique (124), entrer et mémoriser ledit jeu de données (R1) dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) et le chiffrer dans ladite première carte électronique (124) au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite première carte électronique (124) et de ladite ou desdites clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124),

délivrer ledit premier jeu de données (R1) à partir de ladite première carte électronique (124) sous forme chiffrée par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte d'entrée/sortie de ladite première carte électronique (124), le transférer par l'intermédiaire de ladite première station (122) vers ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) et le transférer de là par l'intermédiaire desdits moyens d'interface dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100) vers ladite ligne de transmission (128, 228),

faire recevoir ledit premier jeu de données (R1) par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sous forme chiffrée par l'intermédiaire desdits moyens d'interface dudit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200), le transférer vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) par l'intermédiaire de ladite deuxième station (222) et par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte d'entrée/sortie de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), l'entrer et le mémoriser temporairement dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

délivrer ledit premier jeu de données (R1), reçu par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sous forme chiffrée, à partir de ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et le déchiffrer dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et de ladite clé ou desdites clés de déchiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

entrer et mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) ledit premier jeu de données (R1) reçu par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sous forme chiffrée, et déchiffré dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

engendrer un deuxième jeu de données (R2) dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), et entrer et mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) ledit deuxième

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jeu (R2) de données,

engendrer dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) une première combinaison (R1, R2) dudit premier jeu de données (R1) reçu par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sous forme chiffrée, déchiffré et mémorisé dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et dudit deuxième jeu de données (R2) mémorisé dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), entrer et mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) ladite première combinaison (R1, R2),

chiffrer ladite première combinaison (R1, R2) dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et de ladite clé ou desdites clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

délivrer ladite première combinaison (R1, R2) à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) sous forme chiffrée par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte d'entrée/sortie de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), la transférer par l'intermédiaire de ladite deuxième station (222) vers ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) et la transférer de là par l'intermédiaire desdits moyens d'interface dudit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) vers ladite ligne de transmission (128, 228),

faire recevoir par le premier système d'ordinateur (100) ladite première combinaison (R1, R2) sous forme chiffrée par l'intermédiaire dudit moyen d'interface dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100), la transférer vers ladite première carte électronique (124) par l'intermédiaire de ladite première station (122) et par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte d'entrée/sortie de ladite première carte électronique (124), l'entrer et la mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124),

délivrer à partir de ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) ladite première combinaison (R1, R2) reçue par ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) sous forme chiffrée et la déchiffrer dans ladite première carte électronique (124) au moyen du moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite première carte électronique (124) et de ladite clé ou desdites clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124),

entrer et mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) ladite première combinaison (R1, R2) reçue par ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) sous forme chiffrée, et déchiffrée dans ladite première carte électronique (124),

décombiner ladite première combinaison (R1, R2) mémorisée dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) pour produire un premier jeu de données (R1) retransmis vers ladite première carte électronique (124) et un deuxième jeu de données (R2) transféré vers ladite première carte électronique (124),

entrer et mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) ledit premier jeu de données (R1) retransmis vers ladite première carte électronique (124) et ledit deuxième jeu de données (R2) transféré vers ladite première carte électronique (124),

comparer ledit premier jeu de données (R1) mémorisé dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) audit premier jeu de données (R1) retransmis vers ladite première carte électronique (124) et mémorisé dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) en vue d'une vérification d'identité entre ces jeux de données pour vérifier l'authenticité de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) par rapport à ladite première carte électronique (124),

engendrer un troisième jeu de données (R3) dans ladite première carte électronique (124), entrer et mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) ledit troisième jeu de données (R3),

engendrer dans ladite première carte électronique (124) une deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) dudit deuxième jeu de données (R2) reçu sous forme chiffrée par ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100), déchiffré et mémorisé dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) et dudit troisième jeu de données (R3) mémorisé dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124), entrer et mémoriser ladite combinaison (R2, R3) dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124),

chiffrer ladite deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) dans ladite première carte électronique (124) au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite première carte électronique (124) et de ladite clé ou desdites clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124),

délivrer ladite deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) à partir de ladite première carte électronique (124) sous forme chiffrée par l'intermédiaire de la porte entrée/sortie de ladite première carte électronique (124), la transférer par l'intermédiaire de ladite première station (122) vers ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) et la transférer de là par l'intermédiaire desdits moyens d'interface dudit premier système

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d'ordinateur (100) vers ladite ligne de transmission (128, 228) de données,

faire recevoir ladite deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sous forme chiffrée par l'intermédiaire dudit moyen d'interface dudit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200), la transférer vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) par l'intermédiaire de ladite deuxième station (222) et par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte d'entrée/sortie de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), l'entrer et la mémoriser temporairement dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

délivrer à partir de ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) ladite deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) reçue par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sous forme chiffrée et la déchiffrer dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et de ladite clé ou desdites clés de déchiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

entrer et mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) ladite deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) reçue par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sous forme chiffrée, et déchiffrée,

décombiner ladite deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) mémorisée dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) pour produire un deuxième jeu de données (R2) retransmis vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et un troisième jeu de données (R3) transféré vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

entrer et mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) ledit deuxième jeu de données (R2) retransmis vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et ledit troisième jeu de données (R3) transféré vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), et

comparer ledit deuxième jeu de données (R2) mémorisé dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) avec le deuxième jeu de données (R2) retransmis vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et mémorisé dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) en vue d'une vérification d'identité entre ces jeux de données pour vérifier l'authenticité de ladite première carte électronique (124) vis-à-vis de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224).

6. Un procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que ladite vérification d'intégrité est effectuée par les étapes consistant à

engendrer une version compactée desdites données dans ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) ou ladite première carte électronique (124), entrer et mémoriser ladite version compactée dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124),

engendrer dans ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) ou dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) une version compactée desdites données transférées audit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200), entrer et mémoriser ladite version compactée dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

délivrer à partir de ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) ladite version compactée mémorisée dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) et la chiffrer dans ladite première carte électronique (124) au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite première carte électronique (124) et de ladite ou desdites clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124),

délivrer à partir de ladite première carte électronique (124) par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte d'entrée/sortie de ladite première carte électronique (124) ladite version compactée des données, chiffrée par ledit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite première carte électronique (124), la transférer par l'intermédiaire de ladite première station (122) vers ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) et la transférer de là par l'intermédiaire desdits moyens d'interface dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100) vers ladite ligne de transmission (128, 228) de données,

faire recevoir par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200), par l'intermédiaire desdits moyens d'interface dudit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200), ladite version chiffrée et compactée desdites données, transférée à partir dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100), la transférer vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) par l'intermédiaire de ladite deuxième station (222) et par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte d'entrée/sortie de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), l'entrer et la mémoriser temporairement dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

délivrer sous forme chiffrée à partir de ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) ladite version compactée desdites données reçue par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) et la déchiffrer dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et de ladite clé ou desdites clés de déchiffrage mé-

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morisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

entrer et mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) ladite version compactée déchiffrée des données, reçue par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sous forme chiffrée, et déchiffrée par ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

effectuer dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) une comparaison de ladite version compactée des données mémorisée dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) avec ladite version compactée déchiffrée des données reçue par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) sous forme chiffrée et déchiffrée en vue d'une vérification de l'intégrité desdites données transférées à partir dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100) ou de l'identité entre elles et lesdites données reçues par le deuxième système d'ordinateur (200).

7. Un procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que ladite vérification d'intégrité est effectuée par les étapes consistant à

engendrer une version compactée desdites données ou desdits documents électroniques dans ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) ou dans ladite première carte électronique (124), entrer et mémoriser ladite version compactée dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124)

engendrer dans ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) ou ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), une version compactée desdites données transférées vers ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) ou dudit document électronique transféré vers ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200), entrer et mémoriser ladite version compactée dans ladite mémoire interne dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224),

délivrer ladite version compactée mémorisée dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) à partir de ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et la chiffrer dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) et de ladite clé ou desdites clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite deuxième carte électronique,

délivrer à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) par l'intermédiaire de ladite porte entrée-sortie de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), ladite version compactée de données ou de document chiffré par ledit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), la transférer par l'intermédiaire de ladite deuxième station (222) vers ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) et la transférer de là par l'intermédiaire desdits moyens d'interface dudit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) vers ladite ligne de transmission (128, 228),

faire recevoir par ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) par l'intermédiaire desdits moyens d'interface dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100) ladite version chiffrée et compactée des données transférée à partir du deuxième système d'ordinateur (200), la transférer à ladite première carte électronique (124) par l'intermédiaire de ladite première station (122) et de ladite porte d'entrée-sortie de ladite première carte électronique (124), l'entrer et la mémoriser temporairement dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124),

délivrer à partir de ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) ladite version compactée des données reçue par ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) sous forme chiffrée et la déchiffrer dans ladite première carte électronique (124) au moyen dudit moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage de ladite première carte électronique (124) et de ladite clé ou desdites clés de déchiffrage mémorisées dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124),

entrer et mémoriser dans ladite mémoire interne de ladite première carte électronique (124) ladite version déchiffrée, compactée des données reçue par ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) sous forme chiffrée, et déchiffrée par ladite première carte électronique (124),

effectuer dans ladite première carte électronique (124) une comparaison entre ladite version compactée des données mémorisée dans ladite première carte électronique (124) et ladite version déchiffrée, compactée des données reçue par ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) sous forme chiffrée, et déchiffrée, afin de vérifier l'intégrité des premières données transférées à partir dudit premier système d'ordinateur (100) ou leur identité avec lesdites données reçues par ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200).

8. Un procédé selon les revendications 6 et 7, caractérisé en ce que sont effectués, en vue d'une vérification d'intégrité, un transfert d'une version compactée de données à partir de ladite première carte électronique (124) vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) ainsi qu'à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) vers ladite première carte électronique (124) et une comparaison entre les deux versions compactées transférées des données et les versions compactées, mémorisées, des données dans lesdites deux

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cartes électroniques (124, 224).

9. Un procédé selon la revendication 6 ou 8, caractérisé en ce que ledit transfert, à partir de ladite première carte électronique (124) vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), de ladite version compactée des données engendrée dans ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) ou dans ladite première carte électronique (124) est effectué simultanément avec ledit transfert desdites données elles-mêmes, lesdites données et ladite version compactée des données étant combinées et chiffrées pour former un tout avant ledit transfert.

10. Un procédé selon la revendication 7 ou 8, caractérisé en ce que ledit transfert, à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) vers ladite première carte électronique (124), de ladite version compactée des données engendrée dans ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) ou dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) est effectué simultanément avec une retransmission, à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) vers ladite première carte électronique (124), desdites données reçues à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), lesdites données à retransmettre et ladite version compactée des données étant combinées et chiffrées pour former un tout avant ledit transfert.

11. Un procédé selon la revendication 8, caractérisé en ce que ledit transfert, à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) vers ladite première carte électronique (124), de ladite version compactée des données engendrée dans ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) ou dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) est effectué simultanément avec une retransmission, à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) vers ladite première carte électronique (124), de ladite version compactée de données reçues par ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), ledit transfert et ladite retransmission de versions compactées de données étant aussi effectués simultanément avec une retransmission, à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) vers ladite première carte électronique (124), desdites données reçues par ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), lesdites données à retransmettre et les deux versions compactées des données étant combinées et chiffrées pour former un tout avant ledit transfert.

12. Un procédé selon la revendication 5, caractérisé en ce que

la clé de chiffrage utilisée pour chiffrer le premier jeu de données (R1) et la première combinaison (R1, R2) est réalisée en utilisant une première clé de signature (SkA) mémorisée dans la première carte électronique (124),

la clé de déchiffrage utilisée pour déchiffrer la forme chiffrée du premier jeu de données (R1) et la forme chiffrée de la deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) est réalisée en utilisant une deuxième clé de vérification (VkB) mémorisée dans la deuxième carte électronique (224) et une identification connue publiquement (IdA) de la première carte électronique (124),

la clé de chiffrage utilisée pour chiffrer la première combinaison (R1, R2) est réalisée en utilisant une deuxième clé de signature (SkB) mémorisée dans la deuxième carte électronique (224), et

la clé de déchiffrage utilisée pour déchiffrer la forme chiffrée de la première combinaison (R1, R2) est réalisée en utilisant une première clé de vérification (VkA) mémorisée dans la première carte électronique (124) et une identification connue publiquement (IdB) de la deuxième carte électronique (224).

13. Un procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que des clés de chiffrage et de déchiffrage utilisées pour chiffrer et déchiffrer les données transférées sont réalisées en utilisant un premier jeu de données (R1) engendré dans une vérification d'authenticité qui est effectuée avant le transfert de données décrit à la revendication 5.

14. Un procédé selon la revendication 9, caractérisé en ce que

la version compactée de données est chiffrée en utilisant une première clé de signature (SkA), qui est mémorisée dans la première carte électronique (124), avant d'être combinée avec les données et d'être en outre chiffrée sous forme d'ensemble, et

la version compactée chiffrée de données est déchiffrée en utilisant une deuxième clé de vérification (SkB), qui est mémorisée dans la deuxième carte électronique (224) et une identification connue publiquement (IdA) de la première carte électronique (124) quand la combinaison des données et de la version compactée a été transférée et déchiffrée sous forme d'ensemble.

15. Un procédé selon la revendication 9, caractérisé en ce que des clés de chiffrage et de déchiffrage utilisées pour chiffrer et déchiffrer la combinaison des données et de la version compactée des données sont

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réalisées en utilisant un premier jeu de données (R1) engendré dans une vérification d'authenticité qui est effectuée avant le transfert de données décrit à la revendication 5.

16. Un procédé selon la revendication 10, caractérisé en ce que

la version compactée de données est chiffrée en utilisant une deuxième clé de signature (SkB), qui est mémorisée dans la deuxième carte électronique (224), avant d'être combinée avec les données et d'être en outre chiffrée sous forme d'ensemble, et

la version compactée chiffrée de données est déchiffrée en utilisant une première clé de vérification (SkA), qui est mémorisée dans la première carte électronique (124) et une identification connue publiquement (IdB) de la deuxième carte électronique (224) quand la combinaison des données à retransmettre et de la version compactée a été transférée et déchiffrée sous forme d'ensemble.

17. Un procédé selon la revendication 10, caractérisé en ce que des clés de chiffrage et de déchiffrage utilisées pour chiffrer et déchiffrer la combinaison des données à retransmettre et de la version compactée des données sont réalisées en utilisant un premier jeu de données (R1) engendré dans une vérification d'authenticité qui est effectuée avant le transfert de données décrit à la revendication 5.

18. Un procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 13, 15 ou 17, caractérisé en ce que la vérification d'authenticité comprend en outre le procédé de la revendication 12.

19. Un procédé selon la revendication 8, caractérisé en ce que

ledit transfert à partir de ladite première carte électronique (124) vers ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) de ladite version compactée de données engendrée dans ledit premier système d'ordinateur (100) ou dans ladite première carte électronique (124) est réalisé simultanément avec ledit transfert desdites données elles-mêmes, lesdites données et ladite version compactée des données étant combinées et chiffrées pour former un ensemble avant ledit transfert,

ledit transfert à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) vers ladite première carte électronique (124) de ladite version compactée de données engendrée dans ledit deuxième système d'ordinateur (100) ou dans ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) est réalisé simultanément avec une retransmission, à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) vers ladite première carte électronique (124), de ladite version compactée de données reçue par ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), ledit transfert et ladite retransmission desdites versions compactées de données étant aussi réalisés simultanément avec une retransmission, à partir de ladite deuxième carte électronique (224) vers ladite première carte électronique (124), desdites données reçues par ladite deuxième carte électronique (224), lesdites données à retransmettre et lesdites deux versions compactées de données étant combinée et chiffrées pour former un ensemble avant ledit transfert.

20. Un procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 6, 7, 9, 10 ou 19, caractérisé en ce que la donnée compactée est engendrée en utilisant une touche commune de compression (Ck) mémorisée au préalable dans les cartes électroniques (124, 224).

21. Un procédé selon l'une quelconque des revendications 1 ou 2, caractérisé en ce que

une ou des clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans la mémoire interne de la première carte électronique (124) inclu(en)t une première clé de chiffrage réalisée en utilisant une première clé de signature (SkA) mémorisée dans la première carte électronique (124),

une ou des clés de déchiffrage mémorisées dans la mémoire interne de la deuxième carte électronique (224) inclu(en)t une deuxième clé de déchiffrage réalisée en utilisant une deuxième clé de vérification (VkB) mémorisée dans la deuxième carte électronique (224) et une identification connue publiquement (IdA) de la première carte électronique (124),

une ou des clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans la mémoire interne de la deuxième carte électronique (224) inclu(en)t une deuxième clé de chiffrage réalisée en utilisant une deuxième clé de signature (SkB) mémorisée dans la deuxième carte électronique (224),

une ou des clés de déchiffrage mémorisées dans la mémoire interne de la première carte électronique (124) inclu(en)t une première clé de déchiffrage réalisée en utilisant une première clé de vérification (VkA) mémorisée dans la première carte électronique (124) et une identification connue publiquement (IdB) de la deuxième carte électronique (224), et

la vérification d'authenticité comprend les étapes consistant à:

a) engendrer un premier nombre aléatoire (R1) dans le transmetteur,

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b) chiffrer le premier nombre aléatoire (R1) en utilisant la première clé de chiffrage pour obtenir un premier message d'authenticité à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124),
c) transmettre le premier message d'authenticité à la deuxième carte électronique (224),
d) déchiffrer le premier message d'authenticité à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224) en utilisant la deuxième clé de déchiffrage pour obtenir le premier nombre aléatoire (R1) à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224),
e) engendrer un deuxième nombre aléatoire (R2) dans le récepteur,
f) combiner le premier nombre aléatoire reçu (R1) avec le deuxième nombre aléatoire (R2) pour obtenir une première combinaison (R1, R2) à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224)
g) chiffrer la première combinaison (R1, R2) en utilisant la deuxième clé de chiffrage pour obtenir un deuxième message d'authenticité à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224)
h) transmettre le deuxième message d'authenticité à la première électronique (124),
i) déchiffrer le deuxième message d'authenticité à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124) en utilisant la première clé de déchiffrage pour obtenir la première combinaison (R1, R2) à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124),
j) séparer la première combinaison reçue (R1, R2) à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124),
k) comparer la valeur du premier nombre aléatoire (R1) engendré dans le transmetteur avec la valeur du premier nombre aléatoire (R1) reçu de la deuxième carte électronique (224) et mémorisé dans la première carte électronique (124) et vérifier, dans le cas où les deux valeurs sont égales, l'authenticité de l'identité de la deuxième carte électronique (224),
l) engendrer un troisième nombre aléatoire (R3) à l'intérieur du transmetteur,
m) combiner le deuxième nombre aléatoire reçu (R2) avec le troisième nombre aléatoire (R3) pour obtenir une deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124)
n) chiffrer la deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) en utilisant la première clé de chiffrage pour obtenir un troisième message d'authenticité à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124)
o) transmettre le troisième message d'authenticité à la deuxième électronique (224),
p) déchiffrer le troisième message d'authenticité à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224) en utilisant la deuxième clé de déchiffrage pour obtenir la deuxième combinaison (R2, R3) à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224),
q) séparer la deuxième combinaison reçue (R2, R3) à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224),
r) comparer la valeur du deuxième nombre aléatoire (R2) engendré dans le récepteur avec la valeur du deuxième nombre aléatoire (R2) reçu de la première carte électronique (124) et mémorisé dans la deuxième carte électronique (224) et vérifier, dans le cas où les deux valeurs sont égales, l'authenticité de l'identité de la première carte électronique (124).

22. Un procédé selon la revendication 1, caractérisé en ce que

une ou des clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans la mémoire interne de la première carte électronique (124) inclu(en)t une première clé de chiffrage réalisée en utilisant une première clé de signature (SkA) mémorisée dans la première carte électronique (124),

une ou des clés de déchiffrage mémorisées dans la mémoire interne de la deuxième carte électronique (224) inclu(en)t une deuxième clé de déchiffrage réalisée en utilisant une deuxième clé de vérification (VkB) mémorisée dans la deuxième carte électronique (224) et une identification connue publiquement (IdA) de la première carte électronique (124),

une ou des clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans la mémoire interne de la deuxième carte électronique (224) inclu(en)t une deuxième clé de chiffrage réalisée en utilisant une deuxième clé de signature (SkB) mémorisée dans la deuxième carte électronique (224),

une ou des clés de déchiffrage mémorisées dans la mémoire interne de la première carte électronique (124) inclu(en)t une première clé de déchiffrage réalisée en utilisant une première clé de vérification (VkA) mémorisée dans la première carte électronique (124) et une identification connue publiquement (IdB) de la deuxième carte électronique (224),

une clé commune de compression (Ck) est mémorisée dans la mémoire interne de la première carte électronique (124) et dans la mémoire interne de la deuxième carte électronique (224),

une ou des clés de chiffrage mémorisées dans la mémoire interne de la première carte électronique (124) et dans la mémoire interne de la première carte électronique (224) inclu(en)t une clé de chiffrage aléatoire réalisée en utilisant un nombre aléatoire échangé précédemment (R1),

une ou des clés de déchiffrage mémorisées dans la mémoire interne de la première carte électronique (124) et dans la mémoire interne de la première carte électronique (224) inclu(en)t une clé de dé-

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chiffrage aléatoire réalisée en utilisant un nombre aléatoire échangé précédemment (R1), et
la vérification d'intégrité comprend les étapes consistant à:
a) engendrer à l'intérieur du transmetteur un premier document compacté (MacA) de données en utilisant la clé commune de compression (Ck),
b) chiffrer le premier document compacté (MacA) de données en utilisant la première clé de chiffrage pour obtenir un premier document compacté chiffré (EmacA) à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124),
c) combiner en une première combinaison les données et le premier document compacté chiffré (EmacA) et chiffrer la première combinaison en utilisant la clé aléatoire de chiffrage pour obtenir une premier message d'intégrité à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124)
d) transmettre le premier message d'intégrité à la deuxième carte électronique (224),
d) déchiffrer à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224) le premier message d'intégrité en utilisant la clé aléatoire de déchiffrage pour obtenir la première combinaison à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224),
f) séparer la première combinaison à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224),
g) engendrer à l'intérieur du récepteur une deuxième version du premier document compacté (MacA) des données reçues en utilisant la clé commune de compression (Ck)
h) déchiffrer à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224) le premier document compacté chiffré reçu (EmacA) en utilisant la deuxième clé de déchiffrage pour obtenir une première version du premier document compacté (MacA),
i) comparer les résultats obtenus de la première et de la deuxième versions du premier document compacté (MacA) et vérifier à l'intérieur du récepteur, dans le cas où les deux valeurs sont égales, l'intégrité de la transmission des données à partir de la première carte électronique (124) vers la deuxième carte électronique (224),
j) engendrer à l'intérieur du récepteur un deuxième document compacté (MacB) de la première combinaison en utilisant la clé commune de compression (Ck),
k) chiffrer le deuxième document compacté (MacB) de données en utilisant la deuxième clé de chiffrage pour obtenir un deuxième document compacté chiffré (EmacB) à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224),
l) combiner en une deuxième combinaison la première combinaison et le deuxième document compacté chiffré (EmacB) de données et chiffrer la deuxième combinaison en utilisant la clé aléatoire de chiffrage pour obtenir une deuxième message d'intégrité à l'intérieur de la deuxième carte électronique (224)
m) transmettre le deuxième message d'intégrité à la première carte électronique (124),
n) déchiffrer à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124) le deuxième message d'intégrité en utilisant la clé aléatoire de déchiffrage pour obtenir la deuxième combinaison à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124),
o) séparer la deuxième combinaison à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124),
p) engendrer à l'intérieur du transmetteur une deuxième version du deuxième document compacté (MacA) de la première combinaison reçue en utilisant la clé commune de compression (Ck)
q) déchiffrer à l'intérieur de la première carte électronique (124) le deuxième document compacté chiffré reçu (Emacb) en utilisant la première clé de déchiffrage pour obtenir une première version du deuxième document compacté (MacB),
i) comparer les résultats obtenus de la première et de la deuxième versions du deuxième document compacté (MacB) et vérifier à l'intérieur du transmetteur, dans le cas où les deux valeurs sont égales, l'intégrité de la transmission des données à partir de la première carte électronique (124) vers la deuxième carte électronique (224).

23. Un procédé selon la revendication 22, caractérisé en ce que le nombre aléatoire échangé précédemment (R1) a été échangé dans une vérification d'authenticité selon la description de la revendication 21.

24. Un système destiné audit transfert de données, par l'intermédiaire d'une ligne de transmission (128, 228), à partir d'un premier système d'ordinateur (100) vers un deuxième système d'ordinateur (200), ce deuxième système d'ordinateur (200) étant autonome par rapport audit premier système d'ordinateur (100), selon le procédé de l'une quelconque des revendications 1 à 11, ledit système comprenant une première station (122) et une deuxième station (222) qui sont reliées audit premier et audit deuxième systèmes d'ordinateur (100, 200) et communiquent avec eux, respectivement, et qui sont reliées en outre, par l'intermédiaire du premier et du deuxième systèmes d'ordinateur, respectivement, et par des moyens d'interface correspon-

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dants, à ladite ligne de transmission (128, 228) de données, ainsi qu'à une première et une deuxième cartes électroniques (124, 224), caractérisé en ce que

ladite première et ladite deuxième cartes électroniques (124, 224) sont temporairement reliées à la première et à la deuxième stations (122, 222) respectivement, ou en sont détachables, ladite première et ladite deuxième cartes électroniques (124, 224) comprennent chacune une unité centrale de traitement de données, une porte d'entrée/sortie pour communiquer avec ladite station correspondante (122, 222), un moyen de chiffrage/déchiffrage ainsi qu'une mémoire interne et constituent ensemble un jeu cohérent de cartes électroniques (124, 224) comprenant une clé ou des clés secrètes cohérentes mémorisées précédemment dans ladite mémoire interne des cartes électroniques (124, 224), ladite ou lesdites clés secrètes étant utilisées comme clés de chiffrage/déchiffrage ou étant utilisées pour engendrer des clés cohérentes de chiffrage/déchiffrage, lesdites clés de chiffrage/déchiffrage étant introduites dans la mémoire interne desdites cartes électroniques (124, 224), et ladite clé ou lesdites clés cohérentes de chiffrage/déchiffrage engendrées en utilisant la clé ou les clés secrètes n'étant maniées qu'à l'intérieur des cartes électroniques (124, 224).

25. Un système selon la revendication 24, ladite première et ladite deuxième cartes électroniques (124, 224) étant du type DES Smart Card de la firme Philips, Super Smart Card de la firme Bull ou CP8 Smart Card de la firme Bull.

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